End the Regime to End the War
With a new Democratic Congress taking office in January, President Trump faces a narrowing window to confront Iran's Islamic Republic. Dr. Walid Phares argues that regime change—not another round of negotiations—is the only path to lasting peace.
By Dr. Walid Phares
Americans have been subjected to an extensive campaign of Khomeinist propaganda for almost 18 months, throughout the 12-day war of 2025 and the eight months of confrontations beginning in February 2026 and extending toward the midterm elections. The purpose has been to convince American public opinion that the Trump Administration and the Netanyahu government unilaterally decided to "attack Iran"—meaning the Islamic regime in Iran—with the objective of imposing unilateral "regime change" in order to seize the country's riches.
The media machine, operating alongside academic, entertainment, artistic, legal, and corporate institutions connected to the Iran Deal, as well as Muslim Brotherhood networks, has relentlessly propagated this central message. Its objective is to delegitimize the air campaign undertaken by the United States and Israel, which, from this perspective, was intended to protect the Iranian people from a regime whose brutality and expanding repression have become increasingly visible worldwide: from June 2009 and the subsequent waves of repression, through the 2019 protests and the 2022 "Women, Life, Freedom" uprising following the death of Mahsa Amini, to the 2025 Lion and Sun Revolution and ultimately the January 2026 massacres, during which reports and estimates have placed the number of civilians killed by the regime at more than 54,000.
The Islamic regime has waged a multidimensional war against the United States and the Iranian people for nearly five decades, beginning in 1979. After the mass assassinations of thousands of opponents of the previous government, the Khomeinist regime turned against its former leftist partners, murdering liberals, intellectuals, members of ethnic communities, and students on Iranian soil. It seized American embassy personnel and held them hostage for 444 days before extending its campaign of kidnappings against American and other Western nationals in Lebanon through Hezbollah, some of whom were subsequently assassinated.
During the 1990s, the regime organized terrorist attacks in Latin America, kidnapped dissidents in Europe, and backed militias on Lebanese territory that kidnapped and assassinated politicians. Meanwhile, the IRGC systematically killed hundreds of American military personnel in Iraq. In short, the Ayatollahs waged a relentless, multidimensional war against America, both in the Middle East and beyond. The regime's agencies and affiliated organizations have been designated as terrorist entities for decades.
The aggressions against Americans did not begin with the post-Cold War period, the Arab Spring, October 7, or the most recent confrontations beginning in 2025. The regime has been at war with the United States since the Khomeinist coup—not a revolution—in February 1979.
President Obama, regrettably, offered the regime a deal in 2015, known as the JCPOA, in exchange for what was presented as an end to the conflict. The agreement involved the release of approximately $150 billion in Iranian assets and economic benefits that, according to its critics, strengthened the regime and its regional apparatus. President Trump cancelled the agreement in 2018 and subsequently faced what could be described as a bureaucratic "intifada" engineered by elements of the Obama-era bureaucracy.
The confrontation escalated in 2019, when President Trump designated the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Following renewed attacks against American forces in Iraq, the United States eliminated the commanders of the Quds Force and associated militia networks in January 2020. The Ayatollah regime subsequently resumed its kidnapping and killing operations against American nationals.
Under President Biden, Washington abandoned much of the Trump Administration's approach and effectively readopted elements of the Obama policy through a series of smaller agreements and exchanges, including negotiations involving hostages. Billions of dollars were transferred to Tehran, but not all hostages were returned. Among them was Jimmy Sharmahd, a German-American freedom advocate who was never returned and was murdered in October 2024 by the regime. Meanwhile, the Islamic regime continued building its nuclear facilities, acquiring missiles and air-defense systems, and financing and training its regional militias, including Hezbollah and Hashd al-Shaabi.
In September 2022, following the death of Mahsa Amini, whose arrest was linked to the regime's enforcement of forced hijab, a massive wave of protests erupted throughout Iran. The regime responded with violence and repression. Unfortunately, the Biden Administration did not intervene meaningfully in support of the Iranian people.
Following Donald Trump's reelection in November 2024, the regime began preparing for another confrontation. It reactivated its nuclear capabilities, acquired additional missiles, and continued developing weapons systems capable of targeting Israel, Saudi Arabia, and American assets throughout the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz region.
With the arrival of the second Trump Administration in 2025, Tehran mobilized its regional forces and refused to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. The regime had already unleashed Hezbollah and Hamas in their attacks against Israel. Israel responded, and the Islamic regime subsequently launched missiles against Israeli cities and targeted American installations in the region. The IRGC reaffirmed that the Islamic Republic remained in confrontation with the United States, expanding its military threats throughout the region.
Consequently, the American strikes against three Iranian nuclear sites and Israeli operations targeting the regime's security apparatus, including Basij forces, were presented as defensive retaliations against an expanding threat.
Approximately seven months later, the Iranian population rose against the regime once again. President Trump issued historic messages supporting the protesters. The regime's security apparatus responded with what has been described as genocidal repression against Iranian civilians, with reported casualty estimates approaching or exceeding 55,000. The United States and Israel responded firmly, but Tehran did not accept surrender or de-escalation. Instead, it expanded its attacks.
Iran's January 2026 Uprising and the Regional War
In January 2026, hundreds of thousands of men and women marched through Tehran and other Iranian cities, demanding the fall of the murderous regime. President Trump addressed the demonstrators directly, encouraging them to continue marching, seize their institutions, identify their oppressors, and take control of the government.
The regime declared war on the Iranian people and deployed its security forces and affiliated militias with orders to suppress the uprising. Estimates of those killed have ranged between 55,000 and 70,000, while tens of thousands more were reportedly detained, imprisoned, and tortured.
The United States and its allies responded with air operations. In retaliation, the regime targeted numerous countries throughout the region and closed the Strait of Hormuz. At that point, Washington and its allies were compelled to defend themselves against a Khomeinist war being waged against them.
Unfortunately, the Administration and the West more broadly gave the regime multiple opportunities to accept a ceasefire and reach a negotiated settlement. On several occasions, just as the United States appeared close to defeating the Islamic Republic's military capabilities, intermediaries assured the President that the IRGC was prepared to end the conflict. America gave the Ayatollahs repeated opportunities to stop the war, but the IRGC repeatedly undermined those prospects.
In reality, the delays in ending the conflict were also connected to the regime's political calculations. Tehran sought to prolong the confrontation and push the American military campaign closer to the midterm elections. The IRGC understood the elections as a potential game changer. Its calculations appeared to rest on the possibility that a more sympathetic political force would take control of Congress and threaten to impeach President Trump if he continued military action against the Islamic Republic.
As a result, the combined military capabilities of the United States and Israel faced increasing political constraints, while both countries approached domestic political crises that could reshape their strategic calculations.
The 2026 Midterms and the Battle Over Trump's Iran Policy
In Washington, the principal contenders—the incoming Democratic majority in Congress and the Trump Administration—are repositioning their demands, plans, and strategies regarding foreign policy and national security.
The "Red-Green Axis," bringing together Islamists and the Woke left, achieved an impressive electoral victory and is now ironically on the offensive against the traditional Blue forces that have historically led the Democratic Party. The radicals want to secure sensitive positions on national security committees and are pushing to weaken the moderates. Ultimately, the Red-Green objective is to prevent the Administration from striking the Islamic regime in Iran, particularly before January, by any means available.
Their calculation is that once the new Congress is seated following the Democrats' sweeping victory in the November 2026 midterms, they will be better positioned to prevent the Administration from taking military action against Tehran, effectively providing the IRGC with political protection until 2028.
The Republicans, meanwhile, are licking their wounds and have not yet formulated a coherent new foreign policy strategy following their electoral setback. The Administration is coping with the congressional defeat, reviewing its staffing, and preparing for the departure of certain officials. The White House is under intense pressure to remove cabinet members and install other appointees who could advise the President on Middle Eastern affairs and Iran.
Yet, as of early November, the Trump Administration retains its full executive authority. American forces remain deployed in the region, the IRGC is strategically deterred, and the President still possesses the military capacity to launch a major campaign against the regime, substantially degrading its ability to threaten Americans and the Iranian people.
One can therefore see an intense race developing between two forces: a powerful Red-Green Axis seeking to build a political protection dome over the Ayatollahs, and an Administration that still has a window of opportunity before January 5.
But what are the challenges?
Trump's Iran Strategy: A Race Against January 2027
A Daytona-like race is now underway within the American political system between the Woke-Islamist axis and the Trump team.
Senator-elect Abdelrahman Mohammed al-Sayed and his supporters are threatening impeachment—and more—if President Trump orders strikes against the IRGC, even before January. This position could eventually be adopted by the broader Democratic Party.
Technically, the Administration has a 60-day window to conduct a military campaign under the relevant War Powers framework. But once a campaign is launched and tangible results begin to materialize, its strategic and political consequences could reshape public opinion and congressional calculations.
The timing is critical. If President Trump succeeds in reshaping his strategy and demonstrating results before mid-December, a positive development in Iran could shift the political atmosphere on Capitol Hill and generate greater support for the mission. The new strategy must be different from the zigzagging approach of 2026. It must also rest on different conditions.
Why More Negotiations With Iran Will Not End the War
First and foremost, the Trump Administration must publicly end its negotiations with the regime. All negotiations.
This would send several messages simultaneously. To the Iranian people, it would signal that Washington is ending its political engagement with a regime accused of mass atrocities against them. To the regime's security agencies, it would communicate that their time is running out. To the Arab Coalition, it would signal that the Khomeinist threat must finally be eliminated and that regional allies have a role to play in supporting a historic transformation. To the Iranian opposition, it would communicate that the moment to prepare for a political transition has arrived.
And to the American people, it would establish a clear objective: the war will end when the regime responsible for perpetuating it is no longer in power.
Continuing negotiations with the regime under the present circumstances risks giving it additional time to reorganize, rearm, and prepare for another confrontation. As a MidEastJournal analysis of the IRGC's consolidation of political, military, and economic power explains, the Revolutionary Guards have become central to the Islamic Republic's survival and possess powerful institutional interests in preserving the existing system.
Can U.S. Military Power Help Bring Regime Change to Iran?
It is important to recognize that no massive new American deployment is necessarily required to change the strategic equation. U.S. forces are already present in the region and possess significant capabilities to dismantle the regime's strategic military infrastructure. That is what many U.S. military officials agree on.
The objective should be to create conditions in which the Iranian population can rise, reclaim public spaces, and liberate its communities, while receiving the necessary protection against the regime's security apparatus.
Such a strategy would represent a fundamental departure from the previous approach. Rather than relying exclusively on conventional military operations against the regime's infrastructure, it would combine American and allied military capabilities with the mobilization of the Iranian population and the political organization of the opposition. The Iranian people would become the central force in their own liberation, with American and allied support designed to neutralize the regime's capacity to massacre civilians and crush the uprising.
The same strategic transformation would have regional consequences. In the Gulf, allied capabilities could help eliminate the threat posed by the regime's fast-attack boats and other military assets. A coordinated regional effort could also address the continuing Houthi threat in Yemen and the danger it represents to the Red Sea and international navigation.
The fundamental difference would be that the objective would no longer be simply to punish the regime or negotiate another temporary arrangement. It would be to create the conditions for its replacement by a free transitional Iranian government.
How Regime Change in Iran Could Unfold
Under this strategic concept, large areas of Iranian territory could begin freeing themselves within weeks, with liberated communities gradually establishing connections and coordination. Meanwhile, the White House should invite Iranian opposition leaders to Washington, beginning with national representatives who have demonstrated their ability to mobilize significant constituencies outside Iran.
The President could then deliver a historic address, surrounded by representatives of a free Iranian transition, speaking directly to the Iranian people inside the country and throughout the diaspora. By the end of the fall, the objective would be to establish the foundations of a legitimate transitional government capable of assuming authority.
By early January, Iran could potentially have entered a new era of freedom, and the war could come to an end.
Congressional hearings would undoubtedly follow, but their subjects would be entirely different. Instead of debating whether the United States should have confronted the regime, lawmakers would be examining how the regime fell, why Washington had not engaged the opposition earlier, and which political and institutional actors had collaborated with the regime since 2015.
A new, free Iranian government would emerge as a potential strategic partner of the United States. Washington would then face a different historical question: What should America offer the Iranian people as they begin rebuilding their country?
The Political Obstacles to Regime Change in Iran
But let us examine the domestic opposition to American support for the Iranian people at this stage.
Within the Republican Party, isolationists and those who previously supported the Iran Deal will be vocal in rejecting an Administration decision to help end the regime. Such a policy could cost Republicans additional votes in the 2027 Congress. However, the sharpest and most determined resistance would come from the incoming Democratic majority.
A major political confrontation would begin this fall and could continue throughout the next two years. The harshest opposition would come from the socialist Democrats and their two political partners: the Woke left and Islamist networks. The position of this axis has been increasingly clear: the Khomeinist regime must be protected from American military action.
While the traditional Democratic leadership may reject military operations and advocate a return to some form of the Obama-era agreement, the Red-Green Axis goes further. It rejects any cooperation with President Trump, whom its members regard as an actual political enemy, and blames him for the elimination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
From January onward, there may be no significant political force in Washington prepared to endorse a new military campaign against the IRGC. Israel, meanwhile, is occupied with forming its own political and governmental arrangements and may become increasingly hesitant to target the Khomeinist regime unless directly attacked by the IRGC.
Unless the regime makes a strategic mistake, its leadership may calculate that initiating another destructive campaign against Israel and the United States would be less advantageous than waiting until it has extracted substantial concessions from both.
With difficult domestic political challenges developing in both countries, Washington and Jerusalem could find themselves confronting a rearming enemy during an increasingly dangerous period, while both become absorbed in the political battles leading to the 2028 presidential elections. Their next major opportunity to confront the Islamic Republic could then be postponed until 2029, should Republicans return to power.
Trump's Choice: End the Iranian Regime or Prolong the War
If the Trump Administration chooses to wait until the new Congress assembles in early January, the opportunity for military action and meaningful support for the Iranian revolution could largely disappear. The strategic consequences of such a delay would be substantial and could affect the region for at least two years.
If, on the other hand, Washington begins another round of negotiations now, attempting to confront the next congressional majority with a fait accompli, the regime will gain additional time and capabilities to prepare for and crush any new popular uprising.
Yet Washington still has time, resources, and political legitimacy to help bring freedom to 95 million Iranians, transform the entire geopolitical balance of power in the region, permanently reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and potentially eliminate the Houthi threat to the Red Sea.
This is a decision that President Donald Trump can make on the basis of his own strategic instincts, with the support of his core political constituency and the execution of a clearly defined policy by the American military leadership. He can, and should, consider using a strategic instrument he has not yet fully employed: launching what could become the mother of all alliances between America and the historic Iranian nation—its people, its opposition, and its aspirations for freedom.
Such an alliance could achieve one of the most consequential objectives of his presidency: not merely ending another military confrontation, but creating the conditions for freedom and prosperity throughout the region.
The fundamental principle is simple:
If he ends the regime, he will end the war.
Dr. Walid Phares is a former foreign policy advisor to Donald Trump, former advisor to the Congressional Anti-Terrorism Caucus, and author of Iran: An Imperialist Republic and U.S. Policy.