A Potential Post-Netanyahu Israel: What Would an Eisenkot Government Really Change in the Middle East?

Gadi Eisenkot could reshape Israel's relationships with Washington and Arab governments without fundamentally changing its security policies toward Hamas, Iran or the Palestinians. But first, he must overcome a deeply divided parliament and a tough road to building a coalition
By Moataz Khalil
Israel may be approaching the end of Benjamin Netanyahu's latest period in power, but a change of prime minister would not necessarily mean a fundamental change in Israeli foreign policy. Former military chief Gadi Eisenkot has been tasked with forming a government following the October 27 election, presenting Israel with an opportunity to reset strained diplomatic relationships, rebuild confidence with Washington and pursue a more pragmatic regional strategy. Yet on the issues that matter most to Israel's neighbors — Gaza, Iran, Palestinian statehood and regional security — Eisenkot's positions may prove considerably closer to Netanyahu's than many outside observers expect.
That distinction is crucial. Eisenkot is a product of Israel's security establishment, not a politician seeking to overturn its strategic assumptions. He shares Netanyahu's determination to prevent Hamas from governing Gaza and to confront Iranian military threats. Where he could differ is in his willingness to pursue diplomatic arrangements, coordinate more closely with Arab governments and Washington, and separate Israel's long-term national interests from the political calculations of its governing coalition.
Whether those differences become meaningful will depend not simply on Eisenkot's intentions, but on the government he manages to assemble and the compromises its members are prepared to accept.

Can Eisenkot Form a Government Without Netanyahu?
The October 27 election produced a fragmented parliament in which Netanyahu's Likud remained the largest party with 27 seats, but his traditional right-wing and religious bloc secured only 53. Eisenkot's Yashar won 21 seats, leading a group of Zionist opposition parties with 48 seats. The remaining 19 went to two Arab parties: the Joint List, with 11, and Ra'am, with eight.
The Arab parties' decision to recommend Eisenkot gave him the backing of 67 lawmakers, prompting President Isaac Herzog to entrust him with forming the next government. Yet a recommendation to the president is not the same as a commitment to sustain a coalition. The parties that want Netanyahu removed remain deeply divided over Arab participation, military service, religion and state, and the future of the Palestinian territories.
The unprecedented electoral influence of Arab lawmakers creates a particularly revealing contradiction. Arab voters helped give Eisenkot his opportunity to become prime minister, but several of his prospective coalition partners reject governing with their representatives. Avigdor Liberman has explicitly opposed a minority government dependent on Arab parties, even while supporting Eisenkot's candidacy. That leaves the former general searching for alternatives among parties that disagree on other fundamental questions.
One possible route involves the ultra-Orthodox parties, United Torah Judaism and Shas, whose combined 13 seats could theoretically bring Eisenkot's Zionist bloc to the 61 needed for a parliamentary majority. But this would require resolving a dispute over military conscription that has destabilized successive Israeli coalitions. Eisenkot has reaffirmed his commitment to national service for all, while the ultra-Orthodox parties continue to demand protection for yeshiva students.
There is therefore a significant difference between the parliamentary majority that recommended Eisenkot and a governing majority capable of implementing policy. Even if he succeeds in replacing Netanyahu, the compromises required to form his coalition could determine how much freedom he has to change Israel's regional approach.
Gaza: The Same Objective, but a Different Strategy?
Gaza offers perhaps the clearest illustration of the difference between strategic continuity and political change.
Eisenkot and Netanyahu disagree sharply over leadership, responsibility for the failures surrounding October 7, and the conduct of the subsequent war. But neither accepts a future in which Hamas retains political control of Gaza while rebuilding its military capabilities.
During the election campaign, Eisenkot pledged to end Hamas rule within 18 months, either through implementation of the American-backed framework or through additional military action. His position reflects the hardline security thinking that has shaped much of Israel's political establishment since October 7. On the fundamental question of Hamas's future, he is not offering a major ideological departure from Netanyahu.
The more consequential difference may concern what comes after Hamas. Netanyahu's government has faced sustained criticism over its failure to establish a workable alternative governing structure in Gaza. Eisenkot, who served in the wartime cabinet before resigning in 2024, has argued that military operations must serve an achievable political strategy rather than become an indefinite campaign without a clearly defined end state.
An Eisenkot government could therefore be more willing to pursue practical arrangements involving Palestinian technocrats, reformed Palestinian institutions, Arab governments and international partners. A coalition less dependent on Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich might also have greater flexibility regarding Israeli military withdrawals, reconstruction and administrative arrangements. Such changes would not necessarily mean accepting Palestinian statehood, which Eisenkot has opposed, but could create greater room for pragmatic compromises over how Gaza is governed.
Yet a more cooperative Israeli approach would not resolve Gaza's fundamental problems by itself. Hamas would still need to relinquish military and governing power, credible Palestinian institutions would have to emerge, and Arab governments would need sufficient confidence in the arrangements to assume meaningful responsibilities. Reconstruction would also require security guarantees, funding and a functioning authority capable of administering daily life.
Eisenkot might offer a more practical path toward implementing a postwar arrangement, but the obstacles would remain formidable. His challenge would be to demonstrate that a different strategy can deliver the same security objectives that Netanyahu has struggled to achieve.
Iran: Strategic Continuity Is More Likely Than a Major Shift
On Iran, the differences between Eisenkot and Netanyahu are narrower still. Both regard Tehran's nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities and regional armed networks as major threats to Israeli security. Neither has indicated a willingness to accept the rebuilding of Iranian capabilities that Israel considers intolerable.
Netanyahu has made confrontation with Iran a defining feature of his political career. Eisenkot's worldview, shaped by decades in military command and national security planning, is similarly grounded in deterrence, intelligence and the willingness to use force when necessary. There is little reason to assume that replacing Netanyahu with another former military chief would make Israel fundamentally less determined to contain Iran.
The differences are more likely to concern execution: the timing of military operations, coordination with Washington, the balance between military pressure and diplomacy, and the management of regional risks. Eisenkot might place greater emphasis on institutional coordination and longer-term strategic planning, but this would not necessarily make him less willing to authorize military action.
For Gulf governments, the distinction matters. A more predictable Israeli decision-making process could make cooperation easier, particularly when confronting threats from Iran and its regional partners. But Israel's fundamental security calculations would remain largely intact, regardless of the identity of its next prime minister.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar: Three Different Strategic Calculations
Perhaps the greatest misconception surrounding a possible Eisenkot government is that removing Netanyahu would automatically improve Israel's relationships with Arab states. It might create diplomatic opportunities, but Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar approach Israel through very different strategic calculations.
Saudi Arabia represents the most consequential potential diplomatic breakthrough, but also the most difficult. Riyadh has not joined the Abraham Accords, and its leadership has increasingly emphasized the Palestinian question as a condition for normalization. Saudi Arabia's position reflects more than objections to Netanyahu or his coalition partners. The kingdom must balance its regional leadership ambitions, relations with Washington, domestic legitimacy, the Palestinian issue and changing perceptions of Iranian and Israeli power.
The Saudi position has hardened considerably, with normalization no longer viewed simply as an obvious strategic dividend. Riyadh has publicly demanded a credible path toward Palestinian statehood, while Eisenkot himself has opposed establishing a Palestinian state. That contradiction would remain even if relations between the two governments became less confrontational.
An Eisenkot administration could nevertheless change the diplomatic environment. A government willing to curb controversial settlement policies, cooperate more seriously on Gaza's reconstruction and work toward practical regional arrangements might give Saudi leaders greater room to explore renewed engagement. But normalization would still require a political bargain satisfying Saudi interests, American priorities and Israeli security requirements. A different Israeli prime minister would make such a bargain potentially easier to discuss, not necessarily easier to conclude.
The United Arab Emirates presents a different challenge because normalization has already occurred. Since signing the Abraham Accords in 2020, Abu Dhabi has developed diplomatic and commercial relationships with Israel that extend beyond the political figures who negotiated the original agreement. Trade, technology, investment and security cooperation provide reasons to preserve those ties despite serious disagreements over Israeli policies.
For the UAE, the question is therefore less whether Eisenkot would make normalization possible and more whether he could remove obstacles to deeper cooperation. Abu Dhabi has strong interests in regional stability, economic integration and preventing renewed conflict. An Israeli government more receptive to Arab participation in Gaza's administration and reconstruction could create new opportunities for practical cooperation.
Yet Emirati leaders would still evaluate Israeli behavior in Gaza and the West Bank, the risks of further regional military escalation, and the wider balance of power. Their interests would not automatically align with Israel's simply because Netanyahu was no longer prime minister.
Qatar is fundamentally different from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Doha's relationship with Israel is shaped by its longstanding engagement with Hamas, its role as a mediator, its relationship with Washington and its broader regional ambitions. Qatar has presented its channels to Hamas as an essential instrument of diplomacy, while Israeli critics have argued that its financial and political relationships with the organization have also helped sustain Hamas's position.
These competing considerations would not disappear under Eisenkot. Israel would still need channels for indirect negotiations while confronting the security implications of Qatar's relationship with Hamas. Eisenkot might handle the relationship differently, but there is little basis for assuming a fundamental improvement without changes in the underlying political and security arrangements.
The wider conclusion is that Arab governments will judge Eisenkot by the policies he pursues and the strategic opportunities they create, not simply by his willingness to speak a different diplomatic language.
Washington: An Opportunity to Rebuild Israel's Bipartisan Standing
A change in Israeli leadership could have especially important consequences for relations with the United States, although not necessarily for the reasons most immediately apparent.
Netanyahu's longstanding personal relationship with Donald Trump has been one of his most significant diplomatic assets. Their cooperation on Iran and regional security has been substantial, and Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated his ability to communicate directly with the American president.
Yet that relationship also exposes a growing Israeli vulnerability. Netanyahu has become closely identified with Trump and the Republican Party at a time when support for Israel is weakening across important segments of American society. The erosion is particularly pronounced among Democrats and younger Americans, but criticism of Israeli policy is no longer confined to the traditional political left.
The 2026 American midterm elections, which returned both chambers of Congress to Democratic control, underline the danger of relying too heavily on a relationship with a single president. Trump remains a powerful actor with two years left in office, but his second term is approaching its conclusion, and Israel's relationship with Washington must endure long after he leaves the White House.
An Eisenkot government could offer an opportunity to rebuild relationships across the American political spectrum. His military background, national security credentials and potentially more pragmatic diplomatic approach could help him engage Democrats, traditional Republicans and American security institutions without abandoning Israel's fundamental strategic positions.
That opportunity should not be overstated. Eisenkot would initially lack Netanyahu's personal influence with Trump, while criticism of Israeli policy reflects substantive disagreements over Gaza, settlements and the Palestinian question that a change of leadership alone cannot resolve. Restoring confidence would require policy decisions, not merely a different political personality.
Nevertheless, the distinction is strategically significant. Netanyahu's relationship with Trump is a personal political asset. Israel's long-term relationship with the United States is a national strategic asset. An Eisenkot government could attempt to strengthen the latter without necessarily sacrificing the former.
This could also have consequences for the Abraham Accords. Greater confidence between Israel and a broader range of American political actors might improve Washington's ability to pursue regional diplomatic initiatives, particularly where cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments requires sustained political support beyond a single administration.
A Historic Milestone for Israel's Mizrahi Jews
Eisenkot's potential premiership would also carry historic significance within Israel. Born in Tiberias to Jewish immigrants from Morocco and raised in Eilat, he would become the country's first prime minister generally identified as a Mizrahi Jew, breaking a longstanding pattern in which Israel's highest political office has been held by leaders of predominantly European Jewish backgrounds. His rise would represent an important symbolic milestone for communities whose contributions to Israeli society, politics and military leadership have not previously translated into representation at the very top of government. His Moroccan heritage also offers a potentially interesting cultural connection to a country with which Israel established diplomatic relations under the Abraham Accords. Yet Eisenkot's regional worldview has been shaped primarily by his military and security career, and there is little reason to assume that family ancestry would automatically produce greater sympathy toward Arab governments or Palestinian political demands.
What Would Actually Change Under Eisenkot?
Israel's election has created a genuine opportunity for political change without producing a consensus on what that change should mean. Eisenkot has secured the mandate to form a government, but the parties that brought him this far disagree on many of the country's most sensitive domestic and security questions. He must first demonstrate that opposition to Netanyahu can become a functioning governing coalition.
If he succeeds, the consequences for the Middle East could be meaningful, even without a fundamental shift in Israeli security doctrine. On Gaza, Eisenkot could be more willing to pursue credible postwar governing arrangements involving Arab and Palestinian institutions while maintaining his determination to end Hamas rule. On Iran, he would likely preserve Israel's core objectives while potentially changing the manner in which military and diplomatic decisions are coordinated with Washington. In the Gulf, a less confrontational Israeli government could reopen channels and remove political obstacles, although Saudi, Emirati and Qatari interests would continue to impose their own constraints.
The most immediate opportunity may be in Washington, where a change of leadership could help Israel begin repairing relationships beyond the Trump administration and addressing the erosion of traditional bipartisan support. That effort would require more than diplomatic goodwill, but it could prove one of the most consequential distinctions between Netanyahu's approach and that of a successor.
Ultimately, the significance of an Eisenkot government would not be measured simply by whether it speaks more politely to Arab leaders, cooperates more closely with American officials or projects a less divisive political image. It would be measured by whether those changes produce different decisions, more effective regional partnerships and a workable strategy for the unresolved conflicts Israel faces.
Replacing Netanyahu would not automatically transform Israel's Middle East policy. But it could change which policies become politically possible — and whether Israel can translate its military power into more durable diplomatic and strategic gains.
Moataz Khalil is an Egyptian, London-based journalist and media researcher specializing in Iran and Middle East affairs. He is a senior contributor to Middle East 24 and MidEast Journal and has written for media platforms across the Middle East.