Israel Election Results 2026: Record Turnout, Arab Vote Surge and the Battle to Form a Government
Netanyahu's Likud leads Israel's first election since October 7, but neither major bloc has secured a majority. Record turnout, a surge in Arab participation and a fragmented Knesset will shape the next government—and its policies toward Gaza, Iran and the Abraham Accords.
By Dan Feferman
October 28, 2026 | Updated with approximately 88% of votes counted; special ballots outstanding
Israelis turned out in extraordinary numbers for the October 27 election, the country's first since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023, and the subsequent wars that transformed Israel's security environment and political landscape. Reported national turnout reached 77.7%, the highest since 1999, with an especially dramatic increase among Arab citizens, who, according to preliminary estimates, voted at a higher rate than Israeli Jews for the first time. After three years of war, political turmoil and bitter disputes over accountability, military service and national security, voters clearly understood that far more than the identity of the next prime minister was at stake.
Yet the results have produced no decisive winner. Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud emerged as the largest party, ahead of former IDF chief Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar, but Netanyahu's traditional right-wing and religious allies remain short of a parliamentary majority, with smaller breakaway parties failing to pass the threshold. Meanwhile, a dramatic surge in Arab political participation has strengthened parties that could hold the balance of power without necessarily joining the next government. The election has revealed two overlapping realities: much of Israel's Jewish electorate remains firmly hawkish on security, but the country is deeply divided over Netanyahu's leadership and the political alliances needed to govern.
According to the latest results reported by Israel's Channel 12, Netanyahu's bloc holds 53 seats, the anti-Netanyahu Zionist bloc 48, and the Joint List and Ra'am a combined 19, with approximately 88% of votes counted. An estimated 430,000–480,000 special ballots, including those cast by soldiers and reservists, remain to be incorporated, along with a small number of ordinary ballots undergoing verification. The central question is therefore no longer simply who won the most votes, but which political leader can assemble a functioning government in an increasingly fragmented Knesset.
Israel Election Results 2026: Who Won and How Many Seats?
Israel elects its 120-member Knesset through nationwide proportional representation, with parties required to cross a 3.25% electoral threshold, equivalent to approximately four seats in the 120-member parliament. A governing coalition ordinarily needs at least 61 seats, making the ability to negotiate alliances as important as the individual performance of any party.
With nearly all ordinary ballots counted, Likud leads with 26 seats, followed by Eisenkot's Yashar with 21, the Joint List and the Bennett-Lapid B'Yachad alliance with 12 each, and the Democrats with eight. Yisrael Beiteinu, Ra'am, Shas, United Torah Judaism and Otzma Yehudit each hold seven seats, while Religious Zionism–Zehut has six.
Party | Seats |
Likud — Benjamin Netanyahu | 26 |
Yashar — Gadi Eisenkot | 21 |
Joint List | 12 |
B'Yachad — Bennett and Lapid | 12 |
The Democrats | 8 |
Yisrael Beiteinu | 7 |
Ra'am | 7 |
United Torah Judaism | 7 |
Otzma Yehudit | 7 |
Shas | 7 |
Religious Zionism–Zehut | 6 |
Total | 120 |
Provisional seat allocation from October 28, before the inclusion of special ballots.
Netanyahu has reason to draw satisfaction from the outcome. Likud has outperformed much of the pre-election polling that placed Eisenkot's Yashar ahead or tied for first place, demonstrating Netanyahu's continuing ability to mobilize support despite the October 7 failures and the political costs of prolonged war. Even the exit polls showed the two blocs running neck and neck, with some projecting a slight lead for Netanyahu and others showing a tie.
Nevertheless, his existing coalition partners have not delivered the 61 seats necessary to return automatically to government. Eisenkot faces a different problem: the anti-Netanyahu parties collectively represent a substantial parliamentary force but remain divided by ideology, personal rivalries and disagreements over cooperation with Arab parties.
The remaining special ballots could still change individual seat allocations. The unusually large number of soldiers and reservists voting through double envelopes makes their impact particularly important, although their political preferences should not be assumed to favor either bloc. Even once the count is complete, the identity of Israel's next prime minister will depend on coalition negotiations rather than the number of seats won by any single party.
Record Arab Voter Turnout Changes the Political Equation
Perhaps the most consequential electoral development is the extraordinary increase in participation among Israel's Arab citizens. Arab-sector turnout was reported at approximately 80%, with Ynet documenting participation of 86.8% in Sakhnin, 84.9% in Kafr Qasim and 82% in Rahat. In Nazareth, turnout reportedly climbed from approximately 48% in 2022 to more than 72%, while Umm al-Fahm saw an increase from roughly 38% to nearly 76%. The Joint List and Ra'am consequently reached a combined 19 seats in the latest allocation, compared with 10 in the outgoing Knesset.
This surge has altered Israel's political arithmetic. Arab parties have historically remained outside most Zionist coalition arrangements, although Ra'am broke that precedent by joining the Bennett-Lapid government in 2021. Depending on the final results, they could again become important to the formation or parliamentary survival of an anti-Netanyahu government. Their increased representation also makes it more difficult to interpret the election through a conventional left-right framework. Arab voters are not simply another component of the Jewish Zionist political spectrum, and their motivations cannot be reduced to support for or opposition to Netanyahu. Crime, public security, municipal funding, economic opportunity, the war in Gaza and questions of national identity have all influenced Arab political mobilization.
The distinction matters when assessing claims about Israel's ideological direction. The preferences of the Jewish electorate and the overall composition of the Knesset are related but different measurements, particularly when predominantly Arab parties hold positions on Zionism and Palestinian nationalism that fall outside the traditional Jewish left-right divide. Arab citizens nevertheless participate in Israel's elections on equal voting terms, and their representation is an integral part of the country's parliamentary democracy. Their growing electoral influence challenges simplistic claims that Arab citizens lack political rights, even as it leaves unresolved disputes over discrimination, national identity and Israel's definition as a Jewish state.
Did Israel Move Right or Vote Against Netanyahu?
The election underscores how much Israel's political landscape has changed since October 7. Much of the Jewish electorate now favors stronger border defenses, military freedom of action, buffer zones and a skeptical approach to, or even outright rejection of, Palestinian sovereignty. These positions, once associated primarily with the nationalist right, have become increasingly common across the Zionist political mainstream. The traditional peace camp, which regarded territorial concessions and negotiations toward Palestinian statehood as the principal route to security, occupies a far narrower political space than it did a generation ago.
At the same time, political opposition to Netanyahu should not be confused with a wholesale rejection of those security priorities. Eisenkot and Bennett are former senior security and political figures with distinctly hawkish credentials, as is Avigdor Liberman, who has frequently advocated policies more nationalist than those of Likud. Their disputes with Netanyahu concern leadership, responsibility for October 7, the conduct of the war, democratic institutions and the composition of the government as much as fundamental security doctrine. Even where they disagree over methods, they share considerable skepticism toward the assumptions that shaped the Oslo peace process.
Israel's political divisions therefore increasingly run along several axes rather than a simple left-right continuum. Netanyahu versus his opponents remains the central organizing conflict, but arguments over military service exemptions, religion and state, judicial authority, economic priorities and accountability for October 7 have become equally important. The election may demonstrate the strength of Israel's security-oriented political consensus without delivering a majority to the parties currently governing in its name.
Who Could Form Israel's Next Government?
A Netanyahu-led government remains one possible outcome, particularly given Likud's lead over every other party, but it would require additional parliamentary support beyond his traditional partners. With 53 seats currently allocated to his bloc, Netanyahu is eight seats short of a majority. A coalition relying on Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and the ultra-Orthodox parties would reproduce many of the outgoing government's political tensions, including disputes over military service, settlement policy and the relationship between Israel's security priorities and its diplomatic commitments.
Eisenkot faces an equally complicated path. With 48 seats in the anti-Netanyahu Zionist bloc, he would need to bridge substantial differences among Yashar, Bennett's alliance, Liberman, the Democrats and potentially Arab parties. Such an arrangement could be supported from outside the coalition by Ra'am or the Joint List, but that would introduce political and ideological tensions over national security, Palestinian statehood and Israel's Jewish character. Netanyahu has criticized the possibility of a government dependent on Arab parties, while his opponents argue that the votes of Arab citizens are a legitimate part of the parliamentary system, despite the fact that Netanyahu himself previously explored the possibility of relying on Ra'am's support. The practical question is whether parties with sharply different positions on foundational issues could agree on a sufficiently coherent governing program.
A broader Zionist unity government offers another possible arrangement. A coalition involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot, or other parties outside Netanyahu's traditional bloc, could reduce dependence on smaller factions and produce a more comfortable parliamentary majority. Yet personal antagonism, disagreement over responsibility for October 7 and competing demands for leadership make such an arrangement difficult.
President Isaac Herzog has urged party leaders to approach coalition negotiations with an open mind and avoid sending Israel into another election. Once the remaining ballots are counted and the results formally submitted, Herzog will consult with the parliamentary factions before assigning a candidate the task of forming a government. The process could take weeks, and the final seat count may prove less decisive than the political compromises the parties are prepared to make.
What Will Israel's Election Mean for Gaza and Hamas?
Gaza will be among the most immediate tests of any new government, although the differences between Israel's major contenders are narrower than their electoral rivalry might suggest. Netanyahu and Eisenkot both insist that Hamas must be removed from power and prevented from rebuilding its military capabilities. Netanyahu has conditioned large-scale reconstruction and further Israeli military withdrawals on Hamas's disarmament, while Eisenkot has emphasized implementation of the American framework alongside continued military pressure if necessary.
In October, Eisenkot pledged to end Hamas rule within 18 months of taking office, either through the Trump framework or additional military and operational measures. Netanyahu, meanwhile, rejected the latest 15-point US-backed document on Gaza and reiterated his opposition to withdrawal or reconstruction before full disarmament. Both positions reflect a broader Israeli consensus that Hamas cannot be permitted to emerge from the war retaining its military structure or governing authority.
The principal difference may therefore concern the means of achieving the objective. A Netanyahu coalition reliant on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich would face strong domestic pressure to maintain military freedom of action and reject arrangements perceived as allowing Hamas to survive. An Eisenkot government might emphasize closer coordination with Washington and Arab states, including efforts to develop alternative Palestinian governing structures. But neither would escape the central challenge: removing Hamas's military power while avoiding a security vacuum and establishing an authority capable of governing Gaza without threatening Israel. Any government will also have to contend with Israeli public skepticism toward security arrangements that rely on Palestinian armed groups honoring political commitments.
Iran: Different Leaders, Similar Security Priorities
Iran remains Israel's principal strategic adversary, and the election is unlikely to produce a fundamental reversal of Israeli policy toward Tehran's nuclear program, missile capabilities or regional armed networks. Netanyahu has made confrontation with Iran a defining feature of his leadership, emphasizing Israel's freedom to act militarily without waiting for American authorization and increasingly presenting the weakening of the Iranian regime as a strategic objective. Eisenkot, a former IDF chief of staff, has favored closer coordination with Washington, including a joint strategy for dismantling nuclear infrastructure, containing Iranian military capabilities and enforcing intrusive inspections.
The distinction is significant but should not be exaggerated. Across much of Israel's Zionist political spectrum, preventing Iran from rebuilding threatening nuclear and military capabilities remains a central security priority. The broader doctrine of degrading hostile forces, maintaining deterrence and preventing Iranian-backed organizations from becoming entrenched near Israel's borders is unlikely to change fundamentally with a new prime minister.
Continued tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, the uncertain state of Iran's nuclear infrastructure and the future of US-Iran negotiations will confront either government. Renewed military action remains possible if diplomacy fails or Tehran attempts to restore capabilities Israel considers intolerable, while the American midterm elections could alter Washington's political calculations. The difference between Netanyahu and Eisenkot may ultimately be less about whether to confront Iran than about how closely Israel coordinates its actions with the United States and how much diplomatic room it preserves alongside military pressure.
Abraham Accords: Could a New Government Reopen the Saudi Door?
Israel's election was watched closely by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, whose relationships with Israel have survived years of regional conflict, as well as Saudi Arabia, the most consequential potential addition to the Abraham Accords. Riyadh recently joined Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan in a statement sharply criticizing Israel and identifying its policies as a source of regional instability. Nevertheless, regional specialists interviewed by The Jerusalem Post argued that Saudi Arabia has not necessarily abandoned the prospect of eventual normalization.
The question is whether Israel's next government can create a more favorable political environment for renewed engagement. A Netanyahu coalition dependent on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich would likely encounter greater diplomatic resistance, particularly over settlement activity, Gaza and Palestinian political aspirations. At the very least, their inclusion in a government and their often controversial comments to the press make it difficult for Arab countries to engage publicly with Israel. An Eisenkot-led government, or a broader coalition that excluded those ministers, could find it easier to rebuild relationships with Arab capitals, although a change of leadership would not eliminate Saudi Arabia's publicly stated conditions concerning the Palestinian issue.
An exchange between American investor Bill Ackman and Israeli commentator Gilad Zwick shortly before the election captured this dilemma. Ackman argued that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich had damaged Israel's international credibility and that excluding them from government could help restore relations with Washington and create opportunities for expanding the Abraham Accords. Zwick countered that the ministers represent a substantial Israeli constituency whose support for tougher prison conditions, settlement farms and assertive security policies reflects the lessons many voters drew from October 7. He also noted that opposition parties' refusal to join Netanyahu increases his dependence on the very politicians they want excluded.
Their disagreement exposes a genuine political problem. Positions that some Israelis view as necessary for national security can carry significant diplomatic costs, while excluding particular parties from government can conflict with electoral representation and coalition arithmetic. The same tension runs through the Saudi normalization debate: Riyadh's strategic interests in regional stability, economic integration and cooperation with Washington remain substantial, but its leadership must also account for Palestinian concerns and public opinion across the Arab world.
As MidEastJournal examined in The Abraham Accords at Six: How a New Paradigm Outpaced the Old Peace, normalization has evolved beyond diplomatic symbolism into practical relationships involving trade, technology, tourism and security cooperation. The durability of these connections demonstrates that Arab governments can distinguish between opposition to particular Israeli policies and the strategic value of maintaining relations. Israel's next government will therefore influence the political atmosphere surrounding further normalization, but the underlying regional incentives will remain.
Israel's International Standing: Can a New Coalition Repair Relations?
Israel's next government will inherit a more difficult international environment than the one that existed before October 7. The Gaza war, continued military operations and disputes over West Bank settlements have generated sustained criticism from European governments and international institutions. In September 2026, the United Kingdom announced new restrictions targeting settlement trade and related economic activity, while France, Canada and other governments have supported punitive measures against individuals or organizations linked to violence and settlement expansion. Some measures have been announced for future implementation rather than taking immediate effect.
The diplomatic consequences extend beyond sanctions. Israel has faced growing friction with traditional allies over the conduct of the Gaza campaign, the future of Palestinian governance and the status of the West Bank. Its international standing has deteriorated even as its military capabilities and strategic importance remain considerable. A new government could change the tone of those relationships, but it would not necessarily resolve the substantive disputes behind them.
An Eisenkot-led administration might receive a more favorable initial reception in European capitals, particularly if it emphasized accountability, institutional coordination and efforts to restrain violence in the West Bank. A Netanyahu coalition dependent on Ben-Gvir and Smotrich could face greater difficulty separating controversial statements by individual ministers from the international perception of Israeli government policy. Yet European governments committed to Palestinian statehood would still confront an Israeli political mainstream increasingly opposed to that outcome. The next government will therefore have to balance military freedom of action with the diplomatic and economic costs of prolonged friction, regardless of who leads it.
US-Israel Relations: Trump, Netanyahu and the Limits of Personal Diplomacy
The election also takes place against the backdrop of an unusually close political relationship between Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump. Trump's October 18 endorsement highlighted their cooperation on Iran and regional security and represented a striking intervention by a sitting American president in another country's electoral contest. Netanyahu may benefit politically from that relationship, although there is no conclusive evidence that the endorsement itself produced a decisive shift among Israeli voters.
A Netanyahu-led government would retain established personal ties with the White House, but those connections would not eliminate disagreements over Gaza, settlement policy, military operations or the future of regional diplomacy. An Eisenkot government could bring a different diplomatic style, emphasizing institutional coordination, strategic planning and consultation with American officials. Nevertheless, US-Israel relations rest on interests that extend well beyond the personalities of either leader, including military cooperation, intelligence sharing, Iran and the future of the Abraham Accords.
The American midterm elections may also shape the next phase of regional policy. Washington could reassess its approach to Iran, the implementation of the Gaza framework and the degree of freedom it is prepared to grant Israel in responding to regional threats. Whether Netanyahu or Eisenkot becomes prime minister, Israel will need to manage an American administration that shares many of its security concerns but also has broader regional priorities that may not always align with Israeli preferences.
The biggest potential consequence of an Eisenkot government, or at least one that excludes Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, may be a reduction in the inflammatory rhetoric that provokes international backlash, allowing more room for quiet diplomacy and practical cooperation. The Jerusalem Post reported, citing American sources, that Trump would prefer to see both ministers excluded from Israel's next government.
What Happens Next?
Israel's election has produced a deeply divided parliament, but the results also reveal important changes beneath the familiar Netanyahu-versus-opposition contest. Likud has retained its position as the largest party, while Netanyahu's traditional coalition remains short of a majority. Eisenkot commands a substantial anti-Netanyahu camp but faces formidable obstacles to creating a coherent government. Arab voters have meanwhile demonstrated renewed political engagement on a remarkable scale, potentially giving their representatives an unusually influential role in the next Knesset.
The broader political message is equally significant. Israel's Jewish mainstream has become more hawkish on national security, even as voters remain sharply divided over leadership, accountability and the role of religion in public life. These differences will shape coalition negotiations, but they do not necessarily translate into equally sharp disagreements over Iran, Hamas or Palestinian statehood. The next government could change Israel's diplomatic approach considerably without overturning the security assumptions that have emerged since October 7.
For the Middle East, the central question is therefore not simply whether Netanyahu survives politically. Coalition composition could influence Israel's ability to work with Washington, repair relations with European allies and pursue further normalization with Arab states. But any government will face the same fundamental challenge: preserving Israel's security while creating a regional order in which military strength can be translated into durable political arrangements.
Israelis have voted in extraordinary numbers because they believe the stakes are unusually high. The next test will be whether their divided parliament can produce a government capable of addressing them.
Dan Feferman is the editor-in-chief of MidEastJournal and co-editor of Middle East 24. He is a former policy adviser to the Israeli military and was a fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute. Follow him on X at @DanFeferman.