Why Egypt Sided With Saudi Arabia and the UAE Against Iran in 2026

The 2026 Iran-US/Israel War showed just how Gulf security, economic dependence, and regime survival continue to shape Egyptian foreign policy under El-Sisi

Flags of Egypt, KSA and UAE

By Dr. Nervana Mahmoud

Egypt’s response to the 2026 Iran-Israel-U.S. escalation revealed the deeper logic driving Egyptian foreign policy under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. While Cairo initially attempted to balance diplomacy, mediation, and regional neutrality, Iranian attacks on Gulf states—particularly the UAE—ultimately pushed Egypt into clearer alignment with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf bloc against Iran.

The crisis demonstrated that Egypt’s foreign policy is shaped less by ideology than by regime survival, economic dependence, Red Sea security, and strategic geography. For decades, Cairo has viewed Gulf security—especially the security of Saudi Arabia and the UAE—as inseparable from Egypt’s own national security interests.

At the same time, Egypt has consistently sought enough diplomatic flexibility to preserve regional influence and avoid total dependence on any single axis. The 2026 conflict exposed both the strengths and limitations of that balancing strategy.

Why Egypt and Iran Have Had Tense Relations Since 1979

Relations between Egypt and Iran have remained tense for most of the modern Middle East era.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Cairo and Tehran entered a prolonged period of hostility. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat granted asylum to the deposed Shah of Iran, signed the Camp David Accords with Israel, and strongly backed Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Diplomatic relations subsequently collapsed and remained largely frozen throughout Hosni Mubarak’s rule.

For decades, Egypt viewed Iranian regional influence as a destabilizing force that threatened Arab state systems, Gulf security, and broader regional stability. At the same time, Egypt steadily deepened strategic coordination with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies around shared concerns over Iranian expansionism, Red Sea security, Islamist movements, and the protection of vital trade routes and the Suez Canal. These overlapping interests gradually formed the foundation of Egypt’s long-term alignment with the Gulf states.

How Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Government Tried to Improve Relations With Iran

The 2011 Arab uprisings briefly altered Egypt-Iran relations.

Under President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo explored a cautious diplomatic opening toward Tehran. In 2012, Morsi visited Iran for the Non-Aligned Movement summit—the first visit by an Egyptian president since 1979. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad later traveled to Cairo in 2013, marking the first such visit by an Iranian leader since the revolution. Egypt also permitted Iranian warships to transit the Suez Canal in 2011, symbolically breaking with Mubarak-era restrictions.

This tentative rapprochement reflected both ideological affinity and strategic experimentation. The Muslim Brotherhood leadership sought to diversify Egypt’s foreign relations and engage another major non-Western regional actor. However, fundamental tensions remained unresolved. During his Tehran visit, Morsi publicly criticized Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, highlighting that Egypt was not fully entering the Iranian regional axis so much as testing the limits of diplomatic flexibility. That experiment ended abruptly in 2013.

Why Sisi Strengthened Egypt’s Alliance With Saudi Arabia and the UAE

The military overthrow of Morsi and the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi fundamentally reshaped Egyptian foreign policy. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait immediately poured tens of billions of dollars into Egypt through aid packages, investments, central bank deposits, and grants designed to stabilize the new regime and prevent the return of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Gulf monarchies increasingly viewed as an existential political threat.

This Gulf financial support became a cornerstone of Egypt’s post-2013 regional alignment. Cairo subsequently deepened coordination with the Gulf states across military, political, and security domains. Egypt joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015, supported the anti-Qatar blockade in 2017, coordinated against Iranian influence in Libya and elsewhere, and repeatedly described Gulf security as “an extension of Egyptian national security.”

The UAE, in particular, emerged as Egypt’s closest strategic partner. Cooperation expanded beyond economics into military coordination, regional diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and shared anti-Islamist priorities. Both governments increasingly converged around a regional order centered on authoritarian stability, opposition to political Islam, and resistance to Iranian influence.

How Gulf Money and Red Sea Trade Shape Egypt’s Foreign Policy

Egypt’s alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not driven solely by politics or ideology. It is also rooted in structural economic dependence. The Egyptian economy remains highly vulnerable to inflation, debt pressures, currency instability, fluctuations in tourism revenue, and declining foreign reserves. Gulf financial backing has repeatedly acted as a critical economic lifeline during periods of domestic strain.

At the same time, Iranian-backed groups—especially the Houthis in Yemen—pose direct threats to Red Sea shipping routes and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Any prolonged disruption to maritime trade threatens Egypt’s Suez Canal revenues, which remain essential to the country’s economic stability. This reality makes Red Sea security a central pillar of Egyptian national strategy.

Why Egypt Tried to Reopen Diplomatic Channels With Iran

Despite Cairo’s close ties with the Gulf, Egypt’s relationship with Iran did not remain entirely frozen. Beginning around 2020, Egypt cautiously explored a softer diplomatic posture toward Tehran. Regional contacts gradually increased, partly reflecting broader Gulf-led de-escalation efforts, especially Saudi Arabia’s own rapprochement with Iran.

Egypt sought to maintain communication channels with Tehran while avoiding direct confrontation. For Cairo, this approach served several goals simultaneously: reducing regional tensions, preserving diplomatic flexibility, expanding Egypt’s mediator role, and avoiding deeper regional polarization. However, the 2026 regional escalation ultimately tested the limits of this balancing strategy.

Egypt’s Response to the 2026 Iran-Israel Crisis

At the outset of the conflict following U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, Egypt’s response remained notably cautious. Cairo emphasized diplomacy, regional stability, and de-escalation while avoiding rhetoric that portrayed Iran as the sole aggressor. President Sisi positioned Egypt as a mediator alongside countries such as Oman, Turkey, and Pakistan.

This initial restraint reflected several overlapping concerns. First, Egypt feared the economic consequences of regional war more than it feared Iran itself. A prolonged conflict threatened Suez Canal revenues, Red Sea shipping, tourism, energy prices, and investor confidence at a time of acute economic vulnerability.

Second, Cairo viewed mediation as an opportunity to reclaim regional diplomatic influence. By maintaining communication with all sides—including Tehran—Egypt sought to position itself as an indispensable Arab intermediary rather than merely a subordinate Gulf ally.

Third, Egyptian public opinion complicated the situation. Many Egyptians remain skeptical of U.S. and Israeli military interventions in the Middle East, and some segments of society viewed Iran less as a sectarian threat than as a regional actor confronting Western and Israeli power.

Why Egypt Ultimately Supported the UAE Against Iran

Egypt’s cautious posture shifted significantly once Iranian retaliation directly targeted Gulf states, particularly the UAE. By mid-2026, Cairo moved into far clearer alignment with the Gulf bloc. President Sisi conducted high-profile visits to Gulf capitals, condemned Iranian missile and drone attacks more forcefully, and reaffirmed that Gulf security constituted an extension of Egyptian national security. Egypt publicly expressed “full solidarity” with the UAE while simultaneously continuing mediation efforts and supporting ceasefire initiatives. In May 2026, Egypt also deployed Dassault Rafale fighter jets to the UAE.

Several factors drove this shift.

Egypt increasingly sensed frustration within Gulf capitals over Cairo’s earlier cautious approach. Given Egypt’s longstanding dependence on Gulf financial assistance, Cairo could not afford a serious rupture with Saudi Arabia or the UAE during a major regional confrontation.

At the same time, expanding Iranian and Houthi attacks heightened Egyptian fears over Red Sea trade disruption and declining Suez Canal revenues. Protecting maritime trade routes became an overriding strategic priority.

Ultimately, Egypt’s core strategic interests remained far closer to the Gulf states than to Iran. The conflict reinforced longstanding Egyptian concerns regarding Iranian regional expansion, proxy warfare, instability in the Red Sea, and threats to Arab state systems.

Egypt, Israel, and Regional Competition

The crisis also highlighted subtle competition between Egypt and Israel for regional influence. The Abraham Accords transformed Middle East geopolitics by expanding Israeli influence within the Gulf. Egyptian officials remain wary of any regional order in which Israel eclipses Egypt’s traditional role as the Arab world’s central diplomatic actor.

However, this rivalry operates primarily as a long-term strategic competition rather than short-term reactive policymaking. Even as Israel expanded support for Gulf partners during Iranian attacks, Egypt’s own support for the UAE was driven less by competition with Israel than by economic necessity, Gulf alliances, regional security concerns, and the protection of Egyptian national interests.

What Egypt’s Response to Iran Reveals About Sisi’s Middle East Strategy

The 2026 Iran crisis did not fundamentally transform Egyptian foreign policy. Rather, it exposed the enduring logic that has guided Cairo for decades. Egypt aligns closely with Gulf partners when regime security, economic stability, and national interests require it. At the same time, Cairo continues seeking enough diplomatic flexibility to preserve regional relevance and avoid total strategic dependence.

The conflict also demonstrated the limits of Egypt’s rapprochement with Iran. While Cairo may pursue tactical neutrality and diplomatic engagement during periods of regional uncertainty, Egypt’s long-term strategic center of gravity remains firmly tied to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the broader Gulf-led regional order.

For President Sisi, Gulf security, Red Sea stability, and economic survival remain inseparable from Egypt’s own national security calculations.