The End of the Honeymoon: How Turkey Preserves the Muslim Brotherhood as Leverage Against Egypt
- Moataz Khalil
- 1 day ago
- 7 min read
Ankara has restricted the Brotherhood’s public activities but it has not dismantled the Islamist networks operating from Turkish territory
By Moataz Khalil
The diplomatic rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara is facing a quiet but consequential test.
The restoration of high-level relations created the impression that Egypt and Turkey had overcome the disputes that divided them after the overthrow of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Yet the most sensitive issue between the two governments remains unresolved: Turkey’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and the wider Islamist network that found protection on Turkish soil.
Ankara has reduced the Brotherhood’s public freedom. Egyptian opposition broadcasters have been instructed to moderate their coverage, activists have faced residency pressure, and Turkish officials have taken limited action against individuals wanted by Cairo.
But restriction is not dismantlement. Rather than abandoning the Brotherhood, Turkey appears to have shifted from open sponsorship to a managed freeze. Political figures, media platforms and organizational structures have been curtailed or placed into dormancy without being eliminated. This preserves an infrastructure that Ankara can restrict or reactivate according to the state of relations with Egypt.
From Open Patronage to a Managed Freeze
Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood was never merely a bilateral dispute with Egypt. It formed part of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s wider post-Arab Spring attempt to build Turkish influence through Islamist parties and movements.
Ankara regarded Brotherhood-aligned parties as natural regional partners. Mohamed Morsi’s election represented the high point of that strategy. After his removal in 2013, Turkey became one of the Brotherhood government’s strongest regional defenders.
Erdoğan condemned Morsi’s overthrow, embraced the Rabaa symbol and refused for years to treat President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as a legitimate partner. Turkey also welcomed Egyptian Brotherhood members and opposition figures who left Egypt amid the security measures that followed.
Istanbul became a base for political coordination, satellite television, online activism and campaigns against Cairo. Some prominent exiles reportedly obtained Turkish citizenship, substantially complicating Egyptian efforts to secure their removal or extradition.
When Ankara later sought reconciliation with Egypt, it demonstrated that it could control this infrastructure. In 2021, Turkey instructed Egyptian opposition channels to moderate their criticism of the Sisi government.
That intervention revealed the central reality of Turkey’s policy. Brotherhood-linked activity has continued not because Ankara is powerless to stop it, but because Turkish authorities have chosen containment over elimination.
Turkey can tighten or loosen the permitted space according to its diplomatic needs. The Brotherhood has consequently become a reserve instrument of pressure: less visible than before, but not fully removed.
The Istanbul Book Fair: Removing the Symbol, Preserving the Platform
Exclusive information obtained by ME24 in August 2026 exposed the limits of Turkey’s supposed policy reversal. At the Istanbul International Arabic Book Fair, Mydan—the political platform associated by Egyptian security officials with the militant group Hasm—displayed a mural featuring a prominent portrait of Yahya Moussa, an Islamist figure sentenced to death in Egypt.
Following Egyptian complaints, Turkish authorities removed Moussa’s photograph. They refused, however, to close the Mydan booth, reportedly arguing that its organizers possessed valid legal permits. Cairo interpreted this response as a calculated compromise. Turkey removed the most provocative image while allowing the underlying platform to continue operating.
The episode reflects Ankara’s wider method. Turkish authorities take sufficient action to contain a diplomatic crisis, but stop short of dismantling the networks behind it. Claims of legal constraint are particularly difficult to accept given the Turkish state’s extensive ability to regulate domestic media, political organizations and public activity. When Ankara wants a broadcaster silenced or an organization restricted, it possesses the necessary tools.
The decision to preserve the Mydan booth was therefore not simply an administrative technicality. It signaled that the door for Brotherhood-linked activity remained open, even if that activity was expected to remain within limits set by the Turkish government.
The Khallaf Video and the Value of Turkish Citizenship
A second incident reinforced Egyptian concerns. Egyptian journalist Aboubakr Khallaf broadcast a 32-minute video from Istanbul concerning the detention of his brother in Cairo. The broadcast demonstrated how an opposition figure holding Turkish citizenship could continue directing criticism at the Egyptian government despite restrictions on exile political activity.
Khallaf’s allegations should not be dismissed. Egypt has faced international criticism over the detention of political opponents and the use of security-related prosecutions. Criticism of Egypt’s domestic policies, however, does not by itself establish a connection between Egyptian opposition figures and Turkish authorities.. Nevertheless, the case illustrates the strategic protection Turkish citizenship can provide.It transforms an Egyptian dissident whom Cairo seeks to restrict politically into a Turkish national whom Ankara can defend—and whose public activity it can permit or restrict.
This does not mean that every statement by an Egyptian exile is orchestrated by Turkish officials. It does mean that Ankara determines the political environment in which such campaigning is allowed. The implicit message to Cairo is clear: Turkey retains the capacity to tolerate political, media and human-rights pressure against Egypt whenever bilateral relations deteriorate.
Turkey’s Wider Islamist Ecosystem
The Egyptian Brotherhood file is part of a broader Turkish relationship with political Islam. Under Erdoğan, Ankara has offered political access, media space, protection and international legitimacy to Islamist actors that several regional governments consider threatening. The level of support differs across countries, and these movements do not necessarily operate under a single centralized Brotherhood command.
What connects them is an ecosystem of political parties, charities, media organizations, student associations, business networks and exile communities. As Mideast Journal has previously examined, these structures can reinforce one another even when formal organizational links remain deliberately ambiguous.
Turkey provides this ecosystem with a major economy, sophisticated communications infrastructure, access to international financial and transport networks, and a gateway connecting Europe, Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East.
Hamas is the clearest example of Ankara’s willingness to legitimize a Brotherhood-derived Islamist movement. Turkey does not classify Hamas as a terrorist organization. Erdoğan has defended it as a resistance movement and repeatedly received its senior leadership. In April 2024, he hosted Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh and his delegation in Istanbul.
The United States has also identified Turkish-based commercial activity in sanctions targeting Hamas’s international finances. In 2023, the U.S. Treasury described Turkish real-estate company Trend GYO as part of Hamas’s international investment portfolio.
These findings do not prove that Ankara controls every Hamas-linked activity in Turkey. They do raise serious questions about the environment in which Islamist political and financial networks have been permitted to develop. Turkey has consequently provided more than refuge. It has given selected Islamist actors access, status, mobility and political legitimacy—assets that can later be converted into Turkish regional influence.
From a Turkish Hub to a Global Diaspora
As Turkey and Qatar narrowed the space for overt political activity, Brotherhood-linked networks and elements associated with Hasm and Mydan adapted rather than disbanded. According to Egyptian intelligence assessments reviewed by ME24, these networks are evolving into a decentralized international diaspora.
In Malaysia, Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines, individuals associated with the movement have reportedly used academic programs, student networks and charitable organizations—including the Tabarak Charity—to establish logistical hubs away from direct Middle Eastern scrutiny.
In the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria, exile activists use asylum protections and civil-rights platforms to challenge Egyptian extradition requests and portray Cairo’s security operations as political persecution.International criticism of some Egyptian security policies has given these campaigns additional visibility and credibility.
In South Africa, Djibouti and Somaliland, business investments and community associations can provide lower-profile operating environments where international security monitoring is less intensive.
Egyptian officials also report the use of transit tactics: activists move through intermediary countries, remain inactive for extended periods and later reappear elsewhere. This complicates surveillance, Interpol notices and extradition proceedings.
These allegations require independent investigation. They should not be considered proven solely because Egyptian security agencies advance them. Nevertheless, they demonstrate how Cairo believes the movement has adapted after years of protection and organizational space in Turkey.
Egypt’s Hamas Relationship Does Not Exonerate Ankara
Egypt is not an innocent party. Egypt, for its part, has pursued a firm security and judicial approach toward the Muslim Brotherhood, including arrests, prosecutions and other measures against the movement and its supporters. Cairo also maintains direct intelligence and diplomatic channels with Hamas despite the organization’s origins in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.
That relationship is pragmatic, not ideological. Egypt shares a border with Gaza, controls access through Rafah and requires contact with Hamas for ceasefire negotiations, border security and hostage diplomacy. Cairo treats Hamas primarily as an unavoidable security actor, while Turkey has provided it with high-level political recognition and a more permissive external environment.
Egypt’s dealings with Hamas reveal Cairo’s own selective pragmatism, but they do not negate Turkey’s role in sustaining a wider Islamist infrastructure.
Turkey Has Changed the Method, Not the Policy
The normalization of Egyptian–Turkish relations has not closed the Muslim Brotherhood file. It has changed the way Ankara manages it. Turkey no longer promotes the Egyptian Brotherhood as openly as it did after 2013. Economic pressure and the desire to repair relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates made that policy increasingly expensive.
Yet Ankara has not convincingly dismantled the infrastructure developed during its years of open support. Instead, it has restricted visible activity while preserving relationships, citizenship protections and organizational space that can still provide political leverage.
For Turkey, this managed freeze is inexpensive and flexible. Restricting Brotherhood-linked actors reassures Egypt, while allowing their networks to survive preserves an instrument of pressure against it. For Cairo, the arrangement demonstrates the limits of reconciliation. Egypt can manage or contain political opposition at home ، but it cannot easily dismantle networks protected by foreign citizenship, international law and a government that still considers political Islam useful.
The Turkish–Egyptian honeymoon has therefore given way to a transactional relationship. Turkey has changed the presentation of its Brotherhood policy. It has not abandoned its substance.
Moataz Khalil is an Egyptian, London-based journalist and media researcher specializing in Iran and Middle East affairs. He is a senior contributor to Middle East 24 and MidEast.Journal and has written for media platforms across the Middle East.