A NATO Ally Turkey Is Arming Sudan's Military Junta. The West Is Looking Away.

While Ankara presents itself as a humanitarian partner in Sudan, Turkish drones and military support are helping sustain a war that has devastated Darfur and displaced millions.

By Hayvi Bouzo

Somewhere in North Darfur, a family hears a sound they have learned to dread: the low hum of a drone they cannot see and cannot outrun. When it strikes, it may hit a market, a displacement camp, or a home. The drone is a Bayraktar, built in Istanbul by a NATO ally. The country under attack is Sudan. And in Western capitals, no one seems to find this strange.

Since 2023, Turkey has emerged as one of the most important foreign backers of Sudan's military government, supplying Bayraktar drones and other military equipment to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as the country's civil war devastates Darfur and fuels one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

Since war erupted in April 2023, Turkey has played two roles in Sudan at once. In public, Ankara sends aid ships and calls for peace. In practice, Turkish-made drones have become an increasingly important component of the Sudanese Armed Forces' campaign, including operations that human rights monitors say have caused extensive civilian casualties across Darfur and beyond. These systems are being supplied to a military junta that has shown little interest in political transition or meaningful civilian protection.

Turkey Arming Sudan's Military Junta: Inside the Bayraktar Drone Deals

A confidential dossier submitted to the International Criminal Court in late 2025 names Turkey, alongside Iran, Eritrea, and Djibouti, as having provided military equipment, logistical facilities, and weapons transit routes to the SAF. The Washington Post subsequently reported that Turkish defence firm Baykar transferred arms, drones, and missiles to Port Sudan, and that Turkish technical experts oversaw field testing to fine-tune the Bayraktar Akıncı's targeting on the battlefield.

Human rights monitors have documented extensive civilian casualties resulting from SAF aerial operations in Darfur. Markets, displacement camps, and residential areas have repeatedly come under attack, with investigators raising concerns about the use of advanced drone and precision-strike capabilities without adequate safeguards for civilian life. The same dossier argues that foreign military backing constituted a "substantial contribution" to the alleged war crimes, language that carries specific legal weight under the Rome Statute.

In March 2026, President Erdogan called General al-Burhan directly, expressing support for Sudan's "territorial integrity" and stating that Ankara was "closely monitoring" the SAF's campaign to "restore security." That call came on the same day Washington designated the Sudanese Islamic Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood network embedded within the junta's command structure, as a global terrorist entity. The juxtaposition speaks for itself.

Why Sudan Matters to Turkey's Red Sea Strategy

Turkey's interest in Sudan did not begin with this war. In 2017, under Omar al-Bashir, Ankara secured a 99-year lease on Suakin Island, a historic Ottoman port on Sudan's Red Sea coast, for the construction of a naval dock and military training facility. The deal alarmed Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of whom view Turkish naval expansion in the Red Sea as a direct strategic challenge. this is the story of Turkey arming Sudan's military junta — and why NATO allies have stayed silent.

The war has not extinguished that ambition. If anything, Turkey's support for the junta can be read as an investment in future access. A grateful military government in Port Sudan, dependent on Turkish hardware and diplomatic cover, would be a far more pliable partner for Red Sea basing rights than any civilian successor. For Ankara, the equation is straightforward: drones today, docking rights tomorrow.

The Sudan war has created what the United Nations describes as one of the world's largest humanitarian crises, displacing millions of people and devastating large parts of Darfur. As international attention has focused on Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea, foreign involvement in Sudan's conflict has received comparatively little scrutiny despite its growing impact on the war's trajectory.

This matters for NATO. The Red Sea corridor carries roughly 12 percent of global trade. Houthi attacks on shipping have already demonstrated the waterway's vulnerability. A Turkish military footprint on Sudan's coast, secured through support for a junta accused of widespread atrocities, would add a destabilizing variable to an already volatile chokepoint. It would also mean that a NATO ally's growing influence in a critical sea lane is being advanced through support for a military force accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Humanitarian Aid and Military Support: Turkey's Dual Role in Sudan

None of this stops Ankara from presenting itself as Sudan's benefactor. Turkey has dispatched six humanitarian "Goodness Ships" from Mersin, carrying thousands of tonnes of food, medical supplies, and shelter materials. TIKA, Turkey's development agency, has installed solar water systems in Red Sea state and funded agricultural and healthcare projects. Erdogan regularly calls for peace in public statements.

The pattern is familiar from Libya and Somalia: military hardware for one faction, humanitarian branding for international audiences, and infrastructure investments that create long-term dependency. It is not peacemaking. It is market capture dressed in the language of solidarity.

Why NATO and Western Governments Remain Silent

Western governments have sanctioned individual SAF commanders. They have condemned aerial bombardment. They have called for arms embargoes. But they have not named Turkey as part of the problem. The reluctance is understandable in narrow diplomatic terms: Ankara controls NATO's southern flank, manages migration flows into Europe, and mediates between Russia and Ukraine. Picking a fight over Sudan feels costly.

But the cost of silence is higher. Every report of civilian casualties linked to SAF drone operations erodes the credibility of a rules-based order that NATO claims to defend. Every aid ship that sails alongside a weapons shipment makes a mockery of humanitarian principles. And every day that Turkey's dual game goes unchallenged, the message to other arms exporters is clear: there are no consequences.

There is little evidence that additional foreign military support will shorten Sudan's war. The more likely outcome is that it prolongs the conflict, deepens civilian suffering, and further reduces the incentives for a negotiated settlement.

The debate over Turkey's role in Sudan is not only about Ankara's foreign policy. It is about the future of the Sudan civil war, civilian protection in Darfur, Red Sea security, and the credibility of NATO allies that claim to support a rules-based international order. Those questions deserve far more attention than they are currently receiving.

Hayvi Bouzo is a Syrian-born American broadcast journalist, Co-Founder and Co-Editor of Middle East 24 (ME24), and Co-Founder and Executive Director of Yalla Productions. She has spent nearly two decades covering U.S. and Middle East foreign policy, interviewing guests at the highest levels of American government and politics. Her writing has appeared in Newsweek, The Jerusalem Post, and Khaleej Times.