The Tripartite Strategic Pact: How Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey Could Reshape Middle East Security

By Ahmed Khuzaie

AI generated photo of Erdoğan, MBS and Shehbaz Sharif.

The new defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey could mark a major shift in the Middle East’s emerging security order.

Signed in Mecca on August 7, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement commits the three countries to a simple but consequential principle: an armed attack on one will be considered an attack on all. The agreement is designed to strengthen collective deterrence and deepen defense cooperation between three of the Muslim world’s most powerful states.

Its timing is no accident. The pact comes amid war and instability involving Iran, renewed missile and drone threats, attacks on critical infrastructure, and growing questions across the region about how much Middle Eastern states can or should continue to depend on outside powers for their security.

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey insist the pact is defensive and is not aimed at any particular country. But Iran is impossible to separate from the strategic environment in which the alliance has emerged. For Riyadh in particular, the lesson of recent years has been clear: Saudi Arabia needs more options.

Saudi Arabia Looks Beyond a Single Security Partner

For decades, Saudi security rested heavily on its relationship with the United States. That relationship remains central, and the new agreement does not replace it. Saudi officials have stressed that the pact does not come at the expense of the Kingdom’s existing Gulf, Arab or international partnerships.

But Riyadh has also been diversifying. Saudi oil installations and other critical infrastructure have repeatedly demonstrated their vulnerability to missiles, drones and asymmetric attacks. The Kingdom therefore has a powerful incentive to build additional layers of deterrence around itself. Pakistan and Turkey offer exactly that.

The agreement tells potential adversaries that a future attack on Saudi Arabia may no longer be treated as a confrontation with Riyadh alone. It could potentially involve two additional military powers—one nuclear-armed, the other a NATO member with a large military and rapidly expanding defense industry. That changes the calculation.

It also comes just eight days after Saudi Arabia advanced the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance initiative, aimed at protecting shipping, energy routes and freedom of navigation across the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and Gulf of Aden. 

Taken together, these initiatives point toward a broader Saudi strategy: strengthen regional security cooperation while reducing the risks of depending too heavily on any single outside guarantor.

Pakistan Has the Most Complicated Role

Pakistan may be the most interesting member of the new alliance because it is trying to do two things at once. It is helping defend Saudi Arabia while also maintaining relations with Iran and positioning itself as a mediator.

And Pakistan’s military commitment to the Kingdom is far from symbolic. Reuters reported in May that Islamabad had deployed around 8,000 troops, a squadron of roughly 16 fighter aircraft—mostly JF-17s—two drone squadrons and an HQ-9 air-defense system to Saudi Arabia under the two countries’ existing defense arrangements.

Pakistani and Saudi authorities did not publicly confirm the details, but Reuters cited multiple government and security sources familiar with the deployment. This gives Pakistan an unusual position. Islamabad can strengthen Saudi defenses and raise the military cost of aggression against the Kingdom while simultaneously using its channels with Tehran to prevent a confrontation from spinning out of control.

That dual role gives Pakistan influence—but it also creates tension. The more the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey pact is perceived as an anti-Iranian military bloc, the harder it becomes for Islamabad to act as a credible mediator with Tehran. Pakistan will therefore have to balance deterrence and diplomacy carefully.

Its long military relationship with Saudi Arabia, combined with extensive defense-industrial cooperation with Turkey, makes Pakistan a natural bridge between the other two members.

Turkey Brings Military Power—and Ambition

Turkey adds a different kind of weight. Ankara possesses one of the region’s largest militaries, decades of NATO experience and an increasingly sophisticated domestic defense industry. Its drone technology in particular has become an important part of its regional influence.

Saudi-Turkish defense cooperation was already expanding well before the new pact. Saudi Arabia signed a major agreement with Turkish defense company Baykar for the Bayraktar Akıncı unmanned combat aircraft, including training, technical support and plans for technology transfer and joint production.

The trilateral agreement therefore builds on an existing relationship rather than starting from scratch. For Turkey, the pact also opens another door into Gulf security.

Ankara has long sought greater strategic influence beyond its immediate borders. A formal defense relationship with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan places Turkey closer to the center of a potentially emerging Muslim-majority security architecture. But Turkey, like Pakistan, has little interest in an uncontrolled confrontation with Iran.

That tension matters. Ankara wants to limit Iranian and Iran-backed influence where it threatens Turkish interests, while avoiding a direct war that could destabilize the region further. The alliance therefore gives Turkey both an opportunity and a burden: greater regional influence comes with greater responsibility when crises erupt.

The Real Test Is What Happens After an Attack

On paper, the central clause is clear: an attack on one is an attack on all. In practice, the difficult questions begin immediately after that sentence.

What qualifies as an attack? A direct missile strike launched by Iran against Saudi territory would present a relatively straightforward case. But what about a Houthi drone launched from Yemen? A militia attack in Iraq? Sabotage against an oil tanker? A cyberattack on Saudi infrastructure?

And even when an attack is identified, what does collective defense actually require? Must Turkey send combat aircraft? Must Pakistan deploy additional forces? Could assistance consist instead of intelligence, air defense, logistics, weapons or diplomatic support?

Those operational details remain far less clear than the political commitment itself. Analysts have cautioned against treating the agreement as a Middle Eastern version of NATO, even though its collective-defense language resembles NATO’s Article 5 principle.

That distinction is crucial. The pact already has political significance. Its military credibility will depend on how the three governments respond when the agreement is tested under real pressure.

Iran Will Look for the Gaps

Iranian reactions to the agreement have been revealing—and not entirely consistent. An Iranian parliamentarian quickly dismissed the pact, arguing that agreements with Turkey and Pakistan would not guarantee Saudi security.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry later struck a more measured tone. Spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Tehran saw no reason to fear that the pact was directed against Iran and even described greater regional reliance on local capabilities rather than outside powers in relatively positive terms.

That does not mean Tehran will ignore it. The alliance potentially raises the cost of direct aggression against Saudi Arabia. If Iran believes a conventional attack could bring Pakistani and Turkish power into the equation, indirect methods become even more attractive.

That could mean greater reliance on proxy forces, maritime disruption, cyberattacks and other forms of pressure that remain below the threshold of an unmistakable state-on-state attack. This is where the alliance may face its most difficult challenge. Iran does not necessarily need to defeat the pact militarily. It can test it politically.

A deniable drone strike, cyberattack or proxy operation could expose disagreements among the three countries over attribution, proportionality and retaliation. Tehran could also seek to exploit their different priorities.

Saudi Arabia is focused above all on protecting the Kingdom, its energy infrastructure and its economic transformation. Pakistan must balance its commitment to Riyadh with its relationship with neighboring Iran and its wider strategic priorities. Turkey wants greater regional influence without being dragged into every conflict involving its partners. Those differences do not make the alliance meaningless. But they do create pressure points.

From U.S. Dependence to Regional Deterrence

The broader significance of the Saudi-Pakistan-Turkey defense pact may ultimately go beyond Iran. For decades, Middle Eastern security has depended heavily on outside powers—above all the United States. 

That system is not disappearing. Saudi Arabia remains closely tied to Washington. Turkey remains a member of NATO. Pakistan maintains its own complicated relationships with the United States, China and other powers.

But something is changing. Regional states increasingly want security arrangements that they themselves can shape, rather than relying exclusively on guarantees from Washington or other global powers.

The Makkah pact fits that trend. Its immediate purpose is deterrence: convincing potential adversaries that attacking one state could have wider consequences. Its medium-term significance lies in deeper military cooperation—intelligence sharing, defense production, training, air and missile defense, and greater interoperability between the three armed forces. 

Its longer-term potential is more ambitious. The agreement is open to other countries, raising the possibility that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey could become the core of a broader regional security framework. Pakistani and Turkish officials have publicly emphasized that participation need not remain limited to the original three members.

Whether that develops into something resembling a Muslim-majority collective-defense bloc remains to be seen. For now, the alliance is better understood as the beginning of a process—not its endpoint.

A New Strategic Reality

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement matters because of what each country brings to the table. Saudi Arabia provides economic power, geographic importance and enormous strategic weight in global energy markets. Pakistan brings a large and experienced military, deep ties with the Kingdom and the unique strategic significance of being the Muslim world’s only nuclear-armed state. Turkey brings military scale, NATO experience and one of the fastest-growing defense industries in the region. Together, they represent a formidable combination.

But the alliance’s success will depend less on its language than on its behavior. Can the three countries agree on what constitutes an attack? Can they coordinate their very different militaries? Can Pakistan and Turkey maintain diplomatic channels with Iran while fulfilling their obligations to Saudi Arabia? And will they actually respond together when one member comes under pressure?

Those questions remain unanswered.

What is already clear, however, is that the agreement changes the strategic environment. It is not simply about preparing for the next war. It is about trying to prevent one by raising the potential cost of aggression—and about signaling that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey increasingly intend to shape Middle Eastern security on their own terms.

Dr. Ahmed Khuzaie is a Bahraini political analyst specializing in Gulf Affairs and Iran. He is the author of multiple books and studies, including “Entanglement: A History of Iranian-Bahraini Relations”. He is a regular commentator on international news and a frequent contributor to numerous leading news outlets and think-tanks.