Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Strikes on Iran Mark a New Gulf Security Doctrine
- Dr. Ahmed Khuzaie
- 7 minutes ago
- 6 min read
How Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Are Redefining Regional Deterrence
By Ahmed Al Khuzaie
The alleged Saudi and Emirati strikes on Iranian territory in March and April 2026 may represent a historic turning point in Gulf security doctrine. For decades, Gulf states relied primarily on diplomacy, deterrence, and Western alliances while avoiding direct military confrontation with Tehran.
That now appears to be changing.
Reports of Saudi strikes on Iranian military facilities and a UAE attack on the Lavan Island refinery suggest a new willingness by Gulf states to project force beyond their borders. Even without official confirmation, the evidence points toward a broader strategic shift in how Riyadh and Abu Dhabi perceive regional security and deterrence.
How the US–Israel War With Iran Changed Gulf Calculations
These developments unfolded in the shadow of the US–Israeli war with Iran, which erupted on February 28, 2026. Iran’s retaliation was swift and expansive. Missiles and drones struck all six Gulf Cooperation Council states, while the Strait of Hormuz was temporarily closed, disrupting global trade and energy flows.
Tehran justified these attacks on the assumption that Western forces used Gulf airspace and military infrastructure to launch operations against Iran.
For Gulf leaders, the implications were profound. Hosting Western defensive infrastructure increasingly meant absorbing Iranian retaliation without necessarily responding directly.
By allegedly striking Iran weeks later — alongside earlier reports of Qatari involvement in retaliatory operations — Saudi Arabia and the UAE signaled that this strategic equation may no longer be acceptable.
The Gulf states were no longer willing to remain passive targets.
The Gulf’s Shift From Defensive to Offensive Strategy
If confirmed, these operations would mark the first time Gulf states crossed the threshold into direct attacks on Iranian territory.
That dramatically alters the regional deterrence landscape.
For years, Iran warned that any Gulf state hosting US military assets or facilitating attacks against Tehran would be considered a legitimate target. By allegedly striking Iranian soil directly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have effectively accepted that risk while attempting to establish a new deterrence framework.
The Saudi Arabia–Iran conflict is no longer confined to proxy warfare and maritime pressure campaigns. It is increasingly moving toward direct state-to-state confrontation.
This shift carries enormous risks. Iranian retaliation could target oil facilities, desalination infrastructure, ports, airports, or even politically sensitive events such as the Hajj pilgrimage.
At the same time, Gulf participation in direct combat complicates diplomacy. Ambiguity and deniability become harder to sustain once military escalation crosses sovereign borders.
Why Saudi Arabia and the UAE Decided to Strike Iran
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not approaching this conflict from identical positions.
For Riyadh, the primary concern is strategic and existential. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 agenda depends on long-term stability and investor confidence. Iran’s demonstrated ability to threaten Gulf infrastructure creates a form of strategic blackmail that Saudi Arabia increasingly appears unwilling to tolerate.
The UAE faces an even narrower margin for error.
As a global hub for aviation, finance, tourism, and logistics, the Emirati economic model is uniquely vulnerable to sustained drone or missile warfare. Even limited disruptions could inflict severe economic damage and undermine investor confidence.
If these strikes were coordinated, Abu Dhabi appears to have concluded that proactive deterrence is safer than passive vulnerability.
That calculation, however, may become far more difficult if the conflict drags on.
Strait of Hormuz and the Global Energy Threat
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints. The temporary blockade already sent shockwaves through global energy markets and intensified fears of broader regional escalation.
Further Gulf-Iran confrontation would deepen uncertainty in oil markets, increase pressure on Washington to stabilize the conflict, and threaten global supply chains.
This escalation also threatens the diplomatic architecture created by China’s 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement. Beijing now faces the uncomfortable reality of balancing relations between two critical energy partners while regional stability deteriorates.
At the same time, prolonged conflict could encourage greater Russian involvement through electronic warfare support, intelligence cooperation, or expanded air defense assistance to Tehran.
Why Modern Air Defenses May Not Be Enough
For Gulf states, military action may reflect growing confidence in their advanced Western arsenals and air defense systems.
Yet modern warfare increasingly favors mass drone saturation over expensive missile defense systems.
Even advanced Western air defenses can be overwhelmed by large waves of low-cost Iranian drones and cruise missiles. Sustained attacks could rapidly deplete interceptor stockpiles and expose critical Gulf infrastructure unless Western resupply remains immediate and reliable.
This creates a dangerous imbalance: Gulf states possess sophisticated defensive technology, but Iran retains the ability to impose prolonged economic and psychological pressure through asymmetric warfare.
Historical Lessons From the Iran-Iraq
History offers sobering parallels.
During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Gulf states were deeply affected by the Tanker War, when Iranian and Iraqi forces targeted oil shipments throughout the Gulf.
At that time, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait relied heavily on US naval protection while carefully avoiding direct strikes on Iranian territory despite repeated provocations.
The alleged 2026 strikes suggest a reversal of that longstanding caution.
The Gulf states are no longer content to remain spectators or indirect participants in regional wars. Instead, they increasingly appear willing to project military force directly in defense of their sovereignty and economic interests.
Yet the central lesson of the 1980s remains highly relevant: once Gulf states become direct participants in confrontation with Iran, escalation can become extremely difficult to control.
Tanker War Bab al-Mandab and the Expanding Maritime Conflict
Another critical dimension of this conflict lies beyond the Strait of Hormuz.
The Bab al-Mandab Strait — connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea through the Suez Canal corridor — is equally vital to global trade and energy security.
If Iran expands its regional leverage through the Houthis in Yemen, Gulf states could face simultaneous threats to both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
Such a scenario would place enormous pressure on global shipping, disrupt oil exports to Europe and Asia, and destabilize international supply chains.
Viewed through this lens, the alleged Saudi and Emirati strikes may also represent an effort to prevent Tehran from consolidating strategic leverage over both of the Middle East’s critical maritime chokepoints.
Three Possible Scenarios for the Gulf
Several trajectories now appear possible.
1. Full Regional Escalation
If Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue striking Iranian territory, the Gulf could evolve into a full theater of war.
Iran may escalate attacks against oil fields, ports, airports, desalination plants, and religious gatherings. For Saudi Arabia, this scenario becomes especially sensitive as the Hajj season approaches.
Iran could exploit asymmetric networks or regional unrest to transform a geopolitical conflict into a broader pan-Islamic crisis that challenges Saudi Arabia’s role as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.
2. Strategic Containment
Alternatively, Gulf states could halt direct strikes and return to mediation efforts.
This would reduce the immediate risk of Iranian retaliation against Gulf infrastructure while containing the conflict primarily within the US–Israel–Iran axis.
However, such restraint could also limit Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s emerging posture of military assertiveness.
3. Hybrid Escalation and Deniability
A third possibility involves continued covert or deniable Gulf operations paired with public diplomatic engagement.
This approach would allow Gulf states to project strength while avoiding formal escalation.
But ambiguity carries dangers of its own. Iran may retaliate regardless of deniability if it believes Gulf states remain operationally involved.
Conclusion: A New Gulf Security Doctrine
The alleged Saudi and Emirati strikes on Iran are more than isolated military episodes. They may represent the emergence of an entirely new Gulf security doctrine.
Iran’s attacks inflicted unprecedented psychological and strategic pressure on Gulf states, forcing Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to reconsider decades of strategic restraint.
For Gulf leaders, failing to respond risked encouraging further Iranian escalation and weakening regional deterrence.
Whether this marks the beginning of a more independent Gulf military posture or the start of deeper regional instability will depend on several factors: Iran’s response, the degree of US involvement, and whether diplomacy can still contain a conflict that increasingly threatens to engulf the broader Middle East.
What lies ahead is not simply a test of military capability, but of strategic calibration — whether Gulf states can sustain a posture of assertiveness while preventing the region’s critical maritime corridors, from Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, from becoming the center of a wider regional war.
Dr. Ahmed Khuzaie is a Bahraini political analyst and commentator specializing in Gulf security, regional geopolitics, and U.S.–Middle East relations. He is the founder of Khuzaie Associates, a political consulting firm, the author of multiple books on the Gulf and Iran and publishes and appears widely in Arabic and international press.