Lebanon’s Paper Sovereignty: Hezbollah Disarmament Cannot Wait for Iran
Lebanon has banned Hezbollah’s military activities. Restoring sovereignty requires enforcing that decision, whatever happens in Tehran.
By Tony Boulos
On March 2, 2026, Lebanon’s cabinet banned Hezbollah’s military and security activities and ordered it to surrender its weapons. Six months later, the group still refuses to disarm north of the Litani River. That gap measures the distance between the sovereignty Lebanon declares and the authority it exercises. The government reinforced its position on April 9, directing the army and security forces to restrict weapons in Beirut to state institutions. The principle could hardly be clearer. The question is whether Lebanon’s leaders will make it binding on the armed organization most capable of defying them.
Lebanon does not need another declaration that the state alone should control weapons. It needs a government prepared to turn that principle into a sustained exercise of authority.
There have been enforcement efforts. In March, the Lebanese army reportedly began arresting Hezbollah members and other armed actors for illegal weapons possession. Those actions matter. But individual arrests do not establish state control over an organization’s arsenal, command structure or ability to initiate hostilities. The test is whether Hezbollah loses the capacity to make military decisions independently of the state. Until then, cabinet decisions risk becoming assurances to foreign capitals rather than rules enforced at home.
Hezbollah’s weapons and the limits of state authority
Lebanese officials know the language international partners want to hear: reform, sovereignty, institutional recovery and state control over arms. Their credibility depends on what follows those words.
When implementation reaches Hezbollah’s red lines, the familiar arguments return: avoiding sectarian strife, preserving civil peace and preventing another civil war. These are serious concerns. A responsible government must account for the danger of confrontation and the army’s capacity to manage it.
But those concerns must shape the method and pace of implementation. They cannot become a permanent exemption from it. A phased plan can protect civil peace while extending state authority. An indefinite postponement leaves that peace dependent on the restraint of an armed organization beyond government control. It allows Hezbollah to determine which sovereign decisions can take effect and which must remain on paper.
The political establishment also bears responsibility. As I argued in MidEast Journal’s analysis of the structures inside Lebanon’s state that protect Hezbollah, armed power survives partly through institutional accommodation. Officials cannot credibly promise to dismantle a parallel military authority while preserving the arrangements that shield it.
The result is a state whose declared authority exceeds its willingness to enforce it. Every retreat teaches Hezbollah that resistance works—and citizens that government commitments are negotiable.
Waiting for Iran is no strategy for Lebanon
The temptation is to wait for regional events to solve the problem. A weakened Iranian regime could leave Hezbollah with fewer resources and less political backing. Its collapse, should it occur, might appear to offer an easier path to disarmament. That possibility is no basis for governing Lebanon.
Whatever individual officials privately expect, a policy of delay effectively makes Lebanese sovereignty contingent on events in Tehran. It postpones domestic responsibility in the hope that outside pressure will reduce the cost of exercising it. What happens if the Iranian regime survives? What if negotiations preserve part of its regional influence? What if Hezbollah adapts to reduced support while retaining enough weapons and domestic protection to defy the state?
Even a profound change in Iran would not automatically transfer Hezbollah’s weapons to the Lebanese army or dissolve the political arrangements that sustain its autonomy. Those tasks would still require decisions in Beirut. Lebanon’s leaders must therefore pursue a policy that works across different regional outcomes. If pressure on Iran creates an opening, they should use it. They cannot make action conditional on that opening.
What Lebanon's Hezbollah Disarmament Plan Requires
The costs of delay extend beyond security. Businesses cannot plan confidently when the government cannot control decisions that may expose the country to war. Families cannot build their futures around an indefinite promise that the state will eventually take charge.
Sovereignty alone will not repair Lebanon’s banks or return depositors’ savings. Financial recovery requires its own difficult reforms. But those reforms need a state capable of enforcing decisions and sustaining public confidence. The government should publish a phased timetable for implementing its existing weapons decisions, with clear geographic priorities, defined responsibilities and regular reports on progress. It should explain what the army needs to carry out each phase and identify the political obstacles preventing implementation.
Public accountability need not expose sensitive operations. Citizens should nevertheless be able to distinguish measurable progress from another announcement: where state control has expanded, whether unauthorized military activity has been curtailed, and whether violations bring consequences.
The same policy must protect civilians, preserve the army’s cohesion and pursue the security arrangements necessary to defend Lebanese territory. These obligations belong together. Restoring sovereignty means giving legitimate institutions the authority and capacity to protect the country and determine its military policy.
Lebanon’s leaders cannot eliminate every risk before acting. They can decide whether risk will be managed through a credible plan or used to justify permanent delay.
The choice is already before them: implement the decisions they have taken, or explain why an armed organization retains the power to override them.
Lebanon cannot wait for Tehran to deliver its sovereignty. The government in Beirut must begin making its own decisions binding.
Tony Boulos is a Lebanese journalist and political analyst specializing in Middle East security and geopolitics. A frequent commentator on Arab and international TV, he provides expert insights into the region’s complex landscape. Boulos is a regular ME24 contributor, delivering strategic analysis on the most pressing issues in the Middle East.