Lebanon After Aoun’s Visit to Washington: State or Hezbollah? Lebanon Has a Last Chance - Either Reclaim its Independence or Lose it for Good

By Tony Boulos

AI-generated image of Lebanon choosing between the state and Hezbollah.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun returned from Washington with more than photographs and diplomatic statements. He returned with a test.

President Donald Trump’s decision to restore direct U.S. flights to Lebanon after more than four decades was an important gesture. So was Washington’s renewed support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the U.S.-brokered framework for southern Lebanon. But the message behind those announcements was more consequential than the announcements themselves: the United States is prepared to help Lebanon recover if its leaders are prepared to govern it as a sovereign state.

Before Aoun’s visit, the Lebanese political class could still hide behind familiar excuses—regional instability, endless dialogue and the need for consensus. After Washington, that ambiguity is becoming harder to sustain. The question is no longer what Lebanon’s leaders promise. It is what they are willing to implement.

Lebanon’s window of opportunity has opened. It will not remain open indefinitely.

Washington’s Offer Is Conditional

For years, Washington treated Lebanon largely as an extension of other regional crises: the Syrian conflict, Iran’s expansion and Hezbollah’s growing military power. Lebanon became less a state in its own right than an arena through which outside powers competed.

Aoun’s visit suggested that this approach may be changing. The United States is again treating Lebanon as a country capable of rebuilding its institutions, restoring its economy and reclaiming control over its territory. Yet American support is not a substitute for Lebanese action.

No serious international partner will indefinitely finance institutions that cannot exercise their constitutional responsibilities. Investors will not return to a country whose government does not fully control its borders. Foreign governments will not keep funding an army that lacks the political authority to enforce the state’s monopoly on force. Nor can Lebanon claim sovereignty while decisions of war and peace remain partly in the hands of an armed organization aligned with a foreign power.

Washington’s offer is therefore straightforward: reclaim the state, and Lebanon will find partners willing to support it. Preserve the ambiguity between state authority and Hezbollah’s military power, and Lebanon risks renewed isolation.

The Pilot Zones Will Test Lebanese Sovereignty

The first test is already underway in southern Lebanon.

Under the U.S.-brokered framework, Israel has begun a limited withdrawal from a pilot area, allowing the Lebanese Army to deploy in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh. The plan envisions phased Israeli withdrawals while Lebanese forces assume sole security responsibility and confiscate unauthorized weapons in the vacated areas.

This is not merely a technical redeployment. It is a test of whether territory vacated by Israel will come under the exclusive authority of the Lebanese state—or whether Hezbollah will eventually return through military positions, weapons depots and infrastructure concealed behind civilian or political cover.

The central issue is therefore not Israeli withdrawal alone. It is what follows that withdrawal.

If the Lebanese Army secures the pilot zones, dismantles unauthorized military infrastructure and prevents Hezbollah’s return, it will build confidence for further withdrawals and wider stabilization. If the government hesitates, the process could freeze, strengthening Israel’s argument that its forces must remain because Lebanon cannot prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding.

The first deployment has already exposed how fragile the process is. Lebanese troops reported Israeli fire near their units, while Israel said warning shots were fired after Lebanese personnel crossed outside the agreed pilot area. The incident ended without casualties, but it demonstrated how quickly confusion or mistrust could derail implementation.

That makes clearly defined responsibilities essential. Each withdrawal must be matched by verifiable Lebanese Army control. Each vacated area must be cleared of unauthorized weapons and military infrastructure. Each violation must be addressed through the existing coordination mechanism before it becomes another excuse for escalation.

The Lebanese Army Needs a Political Mandate

For years, Lebanese leaders have argued that the army lacks the capacity to confront the country’s armed groups. Capacity is a genuine concern, especially after years of economic collapse. But the more immediate obstacle is political authority.

The Lebanese Army has received extensive American and Western training, equipment and financial support. What it still needs is an unambiguous mandate from the government: weapons outside state authority are illegal; unauthorized military tunnels and depots must be dismantled; and no part of the country may remain beyond the reach of state institutions.

Deploying soldiers without empowering them to enforce those principles creates only the appearance of sovereignty. Lebanon does not need another symbolic presence in the south. It needs measurable outcomes.

The experience of UNIFIL offers a warning. An international force can monitor, report and help reduce tensions, but it cannot replace the Lebanese state. During the years in which U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 remained only partially enforced, Hezbollah expanded its arsenal and military infrastructure. Recreating the same model under a different international arrangement would not solve the underlying problem.

The responsibility must ultimately rest with Lebanese institutions.

Hezbollah’s Supply Lines Are a National Security Threat

The challenge also extends beyond southern Lebanon. Recent weapons seizures in Syria—including a truck carrying rockets and drones that Syrian authorities said was destined for Hezbollah—show that the group’s regional supply networks remain a threat. Hezbollah denied the allegation, but the episode underscores the importance of controlling the routes linking Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Securing and demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian border must therefore become a national priority. There is little value in dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure in the south if weapons can continue moving toward Lebanon through the eastern frontier.

This is where the debate over Hezbollah must be understood clearly. Separating Lebanon from Iran’s regional military architecture is not an attack on Lebanon’s Shiite community or on any legitimate political constituency. It is an effort to restore a basic principle of statehood: one government, one army and one authority empowered to decide when the country goes to war.

For decades, Hezbollah and its allies have presented “resistance” as the foundation of Lebanese security. In practice, the policy has carried enormous costs. Lebanon’s economy collapsed, its institutions weakened, foreign investment disappeared and hundreds of thousands of citizens left in search of opportunity elsewhere. Each new confrontation was described as a strategic victory, even as Lebanese communities absorbed the destruction.

Hezbollah’s weapons have also been used inside Lebanon. In May 2008, the group and its allies seized large areas of West Beirut after the government moved against Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network. That episode demonstrated that the arsenal was not reserved solely for confronting Israel. It could also be used to impose political outcomes within Lebanon.

The issue is therefore not primarily what Washington or Israel wants. It is whether the Lebanese Republic can survive while a parallel military organization retains its own command structure, intelligence apparatus, weapons stockpiles and foreign strategic alignment.

Lebanon Must Choose Between a State and a Militia

The opportunity before Lebanon is historic, but unforgiving. Washington has reopened the door. Arab and Western support is available. The framework offers a path toward further Israeli withdrawals, greater stability and, eventually, a broader peace.

But none of it will matter if Lebanon’s leaders again choose delay over decision.

The success of Aoun’s Washington visit will not be measured by diplomatic ceremonies or carefully worded communiqués. It will be measured by the positions secured by the Lebanese Army, the tunnels sealed, the unauthorized weapons depots dismantled, the smuggling routes closed and the political decisions enforced despite Hezbollah’s objections.

Lebanon has spent decades managing its crisis. It can no longer avoid resolving it.

If the government seizes this opportunity, the country may finally begin to emerge from foreign tutelage, armed conflict and institutional paralysis. If it hesitates, it will squander more than a presidential visit. It may lose the last realistic chance to rebuild a sovereign state.

The choice is now unmistakable: Lebanon can have one state with one army, or it can remain a state overshadowed by a militia. It cannot sustainably remain both.

Tony Boulos is a Lebanese journalist and political analyst specializing in Middle East security and geopolitics. A frequent commentator on Arab and international TV, he provides expert insights into the region’s complex landscape. Boulos is a regular ME24 contributor, delivering strategic analysis on the most pressing issues in the Middle East.