Iraq Moves to Disarm Iranian Militias While Hezbollah Gets a Pass

Recent moves by Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali expose a growing inconsistency in U.S. policy toward Iranian-backed armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon.

By Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Map of Iraq

Iraq's Militias Begin Surrendering Their Weapons

Two of Iraq's most powerful Iran-backed militias, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, recently agreed to place their weapons under state authority, marking the most significant step yet toward dismantling Tehran's network of armed proxies in Iraq. The move follows months of pressure from Baghdad and Washington, particularly from U.S. Iraq Envoy and Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, who has insisted that the Iraqi state must enjoy a monopoly on force.

For years, Iraq's pro-Iran militias justified their continued existence first as a force against ISIS and later as a "resistance" movement against the American military presence. But Iraqi public opinion increasingly turned against permanent militia rule and allegiance to Tehran. Several factions have since embraced a more nationalist Iraqi identity, helping pave the way for the current disarmament effort.

Questions remain about whether the process will be fully implemented, especially as some of Iran's most loyal proxies—Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada—continue to resist. Nevertheless, Iraq has taken a significant step toward restoring state sovereignty and reducing the influence of armed groups operating outside government control.

Iraq's Constitution and the Limits of Centralization

Washington's support for disarming militias in Iraq rests on a simple principle: sovereign states should possess a monopoly on armed force.

Yet Iraq's constitutional framework is more nuanced than is often acknowledged. Drafted after Saddam Hussein's fall, the constitution deliberately dispersed power away from Baghdad and permits regional security forces such as the Kurdish Peshmerga.

This makes American support for disarming Iranian-backed militias entirely sensible. But it also raises an important question: if constitutional arrangements matter in Iraq, why are they so often overlooked in Lebanon?

The Rise and Retreat of Iran's Proxy Militias

Following the war against ISIS, the Iraqi government institutionalized the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), an umbrella organization encompassing dozens of mostly pro-Iran militias.

Once ISIS was defeated, however, the original rationale for maintaining many of these groups largely disappeared. Tehran and its Iraqi allies responded by rebranding themselves as a "resistance" force against the continued American military presence.

Yet Iraqis increasingly rejected that message. Many militias gradually distanced themselves from Tehran and embraced a more nationalist Iraqi identity. That shift helps explain why some factions are now willing to surrender their weapons and integrate more fully into state institutions.

While the process remains incomplete, it represents one of the most significant challenges to Iranian influence in Iraq since 2003.

Lebanon Presents the Easier Constitutional Case

Yet the real contradiction lies not in Iraq, but in Lebanon.

If the United States believes that sovereign states should possess a monopoly on force, then Lebanon should be the easier case.

Iraq's post-2003 constitution deliberately dispersed power away from Baghdad and recognized regional security structures. Lebanon's constitutional framework points in precisely the opposite direction.

The Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's 15-year civil war required all militias to surrender their weapons to the state. Every militia complied except Hezbollah, which justified its continued existence as a "resistance" force against Israel.

Unlike Iraq, where debates over regional security forces are embedded in the constitutional system itself, Lebanon's constitutional settlement is clear: the state alone should control armed force.

The constitutional case for disarming Hezbollah is therefore stronger than the constitutional case for centralizing military authority in Iraq.

Why Does Washington Apply Different Standards?

The discrepancy extends beyond the comments of any single envoy. It reflects a broader inconsistency in American policy.

The contrast is evident in official rhetoric. American officials praise Iraqi efforts to place all weapons under state control, yet in Lebanon they often emphasize the weakness of the state and the practical difficulties of disarming Hezbollah. Barrack himself has described Lebanon as a "failed state" and questioned Beirut's ability to forcibly disarm the group.

Barrack has also described Hezbollah as a "legitimate political party" within Lebanon's political system. That observation is factually correct. Hezbollah contests elections, holds parliamentary seats, and participates in government.

But many of Iraq's militias also operate as political actors. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and other PMU factions have long maintained political wings, competed in elections, and exercised influence through parliament. Yet their political legitimacy has never been treated as a reason to exempt them from disarmament.

Hezbollah's justification for retaining its weapons is strikingly similar to the arguments once made by Iraq's pro-Iran militias. Both claimed to be resistance movements confronting foreign threats. Both argued that state institutions were too weak to defend the nation. Both insisted that disarmament should come only after broader political conditions were met.

Washington has largely rejected these arguments in Iraq. It is unclear why they deserve greater consideration in Lebanon.

One Principle, Two Standards

The recent decision by Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali to place their weapons under state authority demonstrates that even powerful Iranian-backed militias can be pressured to submit to government control.

If the principle is that sovereign states should possess a monopoly on force, then it must apply equally in Baghdad and Beirut. Hezbollah's political role is no more a justification for retaining weapons than the political role of Iraq's militias.

Iraq's experience demonstrates that armed Iranian proxies can be brought under state authority. The United States should apply the same standard in Lebanon.

Sovereignty cannot mean one thing in Iraq and another in Lebanon.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the author of The Arab Case for Israel. He is a senior contributor with MiddleEast24.