How Al-Burhan's Alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood Is Driving Sudan Back Into International Isolation

Sudan spent nearly three decades trying to escape international isolation. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's growing reliance on Muslim Brotherhood-linked networks has helped bring it back in less than five years.

By Roushan Bouzo

AI-generated illustration of Al-Burhan and Sudan's political isolation.

In 2020, Sudan was one of Washington's biggest diplomatic success stories in Africa. After decades of isolation under Omar al-Bashir, the United States removed Sudan from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, opening the door to debt relief, foreign investment, and renewed diplomatic engagement. For the first time in a generation, Sudan appeared poised to rebuild its economy, restore its international standing, and complete a democratic transition.

Today, that optimism has vanished. Washington has sanctioned Sudan's military leadership, accused the government of using chemical weapons, and designated influential Islamist groups fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as terrorist organizations. Sudan's civil war has become the world's largest displacement crisis, while its relationship with the West has deteriorated with remarkable speed.

This reversal was not inevitable. It was the result of political choices—most notably General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's decision to increasingly rely on Islamist political and military networks linked to the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. In doing so, he revived many of the same forces that helped isolate Sudan under Omar al-Bashir.

Sudan's Lost Opportunity

Sudan's removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in December 2020 was far more than a symbolic diplomatic victory. It reflected Washington's belief that Sudan had finally broken with Bashir's Islamist political order and was moving toward civilian rule, democratic governance, and economic reform.

The rewards were tangible. In 2021, Sudan reached the decision point for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, opening a path toward reducing nearly $50 billion in external debt. International financial institutions re-engaged, and Western governments viewed Sudan as one of Africa's most promising democratic transitions.

That optimism lasted less than a year. In October 2021, Al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, overthrew Sudan's civilian-led transitional government, abruptly ending the country's democratic experiment. The coup also created the conditions for Bashir-era Islamist figures—including individuals associated with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood—to regain influence within the state and security establishment.

The World Bank warned that the military takeover disrupted Sudan's economic recovery and delayed progress toward debt relief, while much of the international goodwill built after Bashir's fall quickly evaporated.

Eighteen months later, the alliance between Al-Burhan and Hemedti collapsed into civil war. The conflict has devastated Sudan. More than 150,000 people are estimated to have been killed, over 14 million displaced, and state institutions have largely collapsed. The United Nations describes it as the world's largest displacement crisis.

As the war dragged on and the SAF struggled to secure a decisive victory, Al-Burhan increasingly relied on Islamist political and military networks linked to the former Bashir regime, including figures associated with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. What began as a wartime alliance gradually evolved into a broader political realignment that restored Islamist influence to the heart of Sudan's military coalition.

Both sides have been accused of serious abuses. The Sudanese military has been accused of indiscriminate attacks on civilians, obstructing humanitarian assistance, and other violations. In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Al-Burhan personally, accusing forces under his command of attacking civilians, striking hospitals and schools, blocking humanitarian aid, and rejecting efforts to restore civilian rule.

The Return of Islamist Networks

Sudan's diplomatic standing deteriorated even further in 2025. In May, the United States determined that the Sudanese government had used chemical weapons during the civil war and imposed sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. Khartoum denied the allegations, but the decision marked one of the sharpest declines in U.S.-Sudan relations since Bashir's overthrow.

A year later, Washington imposed additional sanctions targeting networks accused of supplying weapons, recruits, and foreign fighters to both the SAF and the RSF. Together, the measures reinforced a growing view in Washington that Sudan was no longer a democratic transition worth supporting, but an increasingly dangerous regional security challenge.

At the center of that shift was Al-Burhan's growing reliance on Islamist forces. Rather than remaining marginalized after the 2019 revolution, Bashir-era Islamist figures steadily returned to positions of influence within the state, the security establishment, and armed groups supporting the SAF. What initially appeared to be a wartime necessity increasingly evolved into a broader political realignment.

Those concerns were reflected in U.S. policy. In September 2025, the Treasury Department sanctioned the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, describing it as an Islamist militia rooted in Bashir-era structures that had received support from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and committed serious human rights abuses. In March 2026, the State Department designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity.

Taken together, these actions fundamentally changed how Washington viewed Sudan. The same military leadership accused of attacking civilians and using chemical weapons was now increasingly dependent on organizations the United States classified as terrorist entities. Whether viewed through the lens of counterterrorism, regional security, or democratic governance, Sudan appeared to be moving back toward the political model many believed had ended with Bashir's fall.

Isolation Without a Terrorism Designation

Sudan has not been returned to the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Formally, that chapter remains closed. In practice, however, international isolation often returns long before any formal designation does. Banks, investors, governments, and international institutions all assess political risk before committing capital or support. By those measures, Sudan has moved sharply backward. The country that stood on the threshold of debt relief and democratic transition in 2021 is now consumed by civil war, sanctions, diplomatic mistrust, and the renewed influence of Islamist networks.

Ordinary Sudanese will bear the greatest cost. Military leaders may continue to find foreign patrons and weapons suppliers, but Sudanese families are left with a collapsing economy, destroyed infrastructure, weakened public services, and diminishing prospects for recovery.

Al-Burhan's Squandered Opportunity

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan did not create every crisis confronting Sudan. The RSF bears enormous responsibility for the country's devastation, while foreign powers—including Iran and Turkey—have prolonged the conflict by supporting rival factions. Sudan's political divisions also predate the current war.

But leadership is judged by choices. Al-Burhan inherited a rare opportunity to reconnect Sudan with the international community after decades of isolation. Instead of consolidating that progress, he increasingly rebuilt his wartime coalition around Islamist political and military networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, undermining the very transformation that had persuaded Washington and its partners to re-engage with Sudan.

Sudan's international isolation did not return simply because civil war broke out. It deepened because military rule once again became intertwined with many of the same Islamist forces that had isolated the country for decades. History may remember Abdel Fattah al-Burhan as the general who commanded Sudan during one of its darkest chapters. But it may judge him more harshly as the leader who inherited Sudan's greatest diplomatic opening in a generation—and squandered it by restoring the political alliances that had helped isolate the country in the first place.

Roushan Bouzo is a Syrian journalist and political analyst based in the United States, specializing in Middle Eastern affairs, conflict, and international relations.