Hamas as the modern day “Islamic Assasins”:With a weakened Iran - the Gaza-based Islamist Terror Group Goes from being an Iranian Proxy to a Turkish One

Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah (Hamas) flag

Since October 7th, and especially following the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, and now the February–April (and possibly ongoing) 2026 US/Israel–Iran war, the Gaza-based Islamist terror group has shifted from Shia Iran to Sunni Turkey as its strategic sponsor. This Turkish support for Hamas, however, has a unique and curious historical parallel.

Amid these shifts, the role of armed groups (mercenaries, even if ideologically driven) in the region has become more prominent, with influence and support networks overlapping and evolving among key regional actors. Turkey is a major Sunni backer of some of these groups, while Iran is another central actor supporting various cells, armed networks, and militant organizations across the region as a vehicle to project power and influence.

The past months have witnessed a series of sensitive geopolitical developments surrounding the Palestinian terror group Hamas and its dual axis of support, particularly Turkey and Iran. Most notably, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a meeting with senior Hamas figures shortly after the movement concluded a visit to Cairo. The timing of this meeting raises important questions about the evolving political choreography surrounding the group.

At the heart of current discussions lies a critical question: how is Turkey approaching the financial and political ecosystem that sustains Hamas? This question has become more pressing in light of several overlapping dynamics.

First, the ongoing conflict, and the previous June 2025 war involving Iran, have significantly altered regional priorities. Second, Tehran is likely to enter a period focused on reconstruction and internal stabilization following strikes on key infrastructure. Third, mounting economic and strategic pressures may compel Iran to reassess the scale and direction of its external commitments, namely its support for proxies.

In this context, Turkey appears to be repositioning itself to fill this strategic vacuum.

President Erdoğan’s engagement with Hamas is not occurring in a vacuum; it also resonates deeply with domestic political considerations. As noted by Turkish academic Helin Sari Ertem, the Palestinian issue has long transcended foreign policy in Turkey, functioning instead as a powerful driver of internal political legitimacy. Support for Palestinian actors, including Hamas, continues to carry symbolic and electoral weight across a broad spectrum of Turkish society.

However, it is worth noting that beyond contemporary politics, Turkish support for Hamas can be framed within a broader historical perspective linked to Islamic political traditions of building and supporting mercenary groups. In this context, it is often argued that the Ottoman Empire historically relied on irregular or non-conventional groups as part of its political and military strategy.

Throughout Islamic history, various powers made use of militant groups that operated in unconventional ways. One famous historical example is the Assassins (Hashshashin), who emerged during the Abbasid era under the Caliph Al-Mustazhir. Other groups included the Ghilman (military slaves, often of Turkic origin, or Mamluks), who formed structured military forces upon which certain rulers depended.

Some Islamic rulers utilized these groups, many of which could be described as mercenary or semi-autonomous forces, to advance political objectives, project or consolidate power, and create deniability. From this perspective, modern support by certain states such as Turkey or Iran for armed groups can be interpreted as a continuation of historical methods of indirect power projection, rather than being viewed through a single, universally agreed lens.

In some cases, this has involved financial backing and efforts to spread political or ideological influence through proxies across different regions. More broadly, this reflects a recurring feature of power dynamics in the Middle East: the use of indirect influence through allied groups rather than direct confrontation.

What is interesting is that this framework is sometimes extended by commentators to interpret contemporary cases, for example, claims regarding Qatar supporting activism abroad, including alleged encouragement of student movements and political demonstrations in the United States, as well as attempts to exert financial or ideological influence within university environments. Certainly, in the case of Qatar and Turkey, there is a strong ideological Muslim Brotherhood dimension that cannot be ignored. However, the Turkish approach cannot be understood in isolation from broader regional calculations.

Since the earliest stages of the current escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Ankara has been actively assessing the potential post-war order. Senior Turkish officials have openly warned of the risks associated with state collapse and power vacuums. Devlet Bahçeli, a key ally of Erdoğan, recently emphasized that weakened states quickly become arenas for armed groups, proxy conflicts, and external intervention, lessons drawn from the Syrian experience on Turkey’s southern border.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s continued maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz underscores its interest in maintaining a presence in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. The safe transit of Turkish vessels through the strait in recent days reflects both economic priorities and broader strategic signaling.

Taken together, these developments suggest a more complex picture, not merely unilateral support for Hamas, but a broader recalibration of roles between regional powers. There are growing indications of a tactical division of influence, in which Turkey and Iran may be navigating parallel, if not coordinated, approaches to non-state actors across the region.

Ultimately, Turkey’s relationship with Hamas appears to be both strategic and enduring. It combines political positioning, regional ambition, and domestic considerations in a way that ensures the issue will remain central to Ankara’s Middle East policy in the foreseeable future. Any strategy or effort to dismantle or contain Hamas must take this dimension into account.

Moataz AlKhalil is an Egyptian, London-based journalist and media researcher on Middle East affairs. He is a senior contributor to MiddleEast24 and has written for many of the top media platforms across the Middle East.