DISMANTLING THE SATELLITE: Inside the Gulf’s High-Stakes Campaign Against Iran’s 'Human Radar' Networks

Gulf security officials warn that Tehran is increasingly relying on covert intelligence networks, religious influence channels, and local operatives to support espionage and wartime targeting efforts across the Arabian Peninsula.

By Moataz Khalil

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Since Iran unleashed its latest wave of aggression against the Gulf Arab states, a troubling reality has emerged from the region's security services: Tehran appears to be relying not only on missiles, drones, and proxy militias, but also on covert human intelligence networks operating inside Gulf societies.

Recent raids and arrests across the Gulf have exposed what security officials describe as a growing effort to recruit, direct, or exploit local operatives for intelligence collection and wartime targeting support. According to data compiled from regional security announcements and international monitoring organizations, Gulf states—including Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—have conducted more than 1,000 arrests over the past four months involving allegations of espionage, subversion, or security offenses linked to Iran.

While governments have generally treated these as individual criminal cases rather than sectarian matters, security officials interviewed by ME24 argue that a significant number involve individuals connected to networks influenced, directed, or inspired by Tehran and its regional partners.

The charges range from unauthorized intelligence gathering and material support for hostile foreign actors to efforts aimed at undermining national security infrastructure. Officials stress that these cases do not implicate Gulf Shiite communities as a whole. Rather, they point to Iran's longstanding strategy of cultivating influence among a small subset of ideologically committed activists, operatives, and clerical networks capable of serving broader Iranian objectives.

The Human Radar Strategy

Military analysts often focus on missiles, drones, and air defense systems. Yet security officials increasingly point to another critical component of modern warfare: human intelligence networks capable of identifying targets, verifying coordinates, monitoring movements, and assessing damage after strikes.

According to Gulf investigators, some recently disrupted cells were tasked with photographing sensitive infrastructure, transportation hubs, military facilities, and other strategic locations. These images were allegedly transmitted through encrypted communications channels and used to provide situational awareness for hostile actors.

An Arab security official told ME24 that recent interrogations uncovered a coordinated effort to collect imagery under the guise of everyday activities.

"Operatives were instructed to photograph sites while appearing to take ordinary pictures of themselves or their surroundings," the official said. "The goal was to avoid attracting attention while systematically collecting useful intelligence."

Security agencies reportedly became alarmed after analysts identified correlations between locations documented by suspects and sites that later became relevant to Iranian military planning. The discoveries prompted several Gulf governments to impose wartime restrictions on photographing strategic infrastructure and sensitive installations.

The Demographic Challenge and Tehran's Influence Model

The ongoing counter-espionage campaign has renewed debate about the geopolitical position of Shiite communities across the Gulf. Twelver Shiites constitute majorities in Bahrain and parts of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, maintain a substantial presence in Kuwait, and form smaller communities throughout the UAE, Qatar, and Oman.

These communities have deep historical roots in the Arabian Peninsula that long predate the rise of modern Iran. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution transformed the relationship between religion and politics throughout the region.

Through institutions associated with the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and the broader transnational religious hierarchy known as the Marja'iya, Iran developed channels of influence that extended beyond its borders. Gulf governments have increasingly viewed some of these networks as potential vehicles for political mobilization, ideological influence, and, in certain cases, intelligence recruitment.

Security officials frequently point to the experiences of Lebanon and post-2003 Iraq as examples of how Iranian influence can evolve from religious and political engagement into durable proxy structures embedded within state institutions.

Clerical Influence and Intelligence Recruitment

"For a significant portion of these radicalized elements, espionage is not viewed as a political crime—they genuinely believe it is a religious obligation," a senior Gulf intelligence source told ME24.

Counterterrorism monitors say they have documented instances in which extremist clerics encouraged followers to assist causes aligned with Tehran's regional agenda. Security officials argue that such messaging can create an ideological environment in which intelligence collection, sabotage, or support activities are framed as acts of religious devotion rather than criminal conduct.

The source recalled an early-career interrogation involving an 18-year-old suspect arrested for participating in attacks against state security facilities.

"The young man displayed no remorse whatsoever," he said. "He believed he was serving a divine cause. It became clear that he was not interested in defending himself. He viewed punishment—even death—as a form of spiritual reward."

Officials caution that such cases represent a tiny minority of Gulf Shiites. Nevertheless, they argue that intelligence services require only a small number of highly motivated recruits to generate outsized security risks.

Financial Networks and the Question of Religious Autonomy

The security debate has increasingly expanded beyond espionage and into questions of financial and religious authority.

Some Gulf-based reformist clerics and public figures have called for the development of stronger indigenous religious institutions capable of reducing dependence on foreign centers of religious authority.

Critics argue that religious tax flows and charitable donations sent abroad can create opaque channels of influence and weaken the development of locally accountable religious leadership. Supporters of reform contend that strengthening domestic religious institutions would reduce opportunities for external political actors to leverage religious authority for geopolitical purposes.

Beyond Espionage: Influence Operations and Political Mobilization

Security officials and former investigators argue that Iranian influence efforts have not been limited to intelligence gathering.

One former Gulf security investigator, now based in Europe, told ME24 that authorities repeatedly encountered attempts by pro-Iran activists to mobilize opposition to major state initiatives perceived as conflicting with Tehran's regional agenda.

The Abraham Accords signed by the UAE and Bahrain provide one notable example. According to the former investigator, authorities confronted organized efforts to stage demonstrations and unrest aimed at undermining public support for normalization with Israel.

"Years later, when reviewing reports about newly arrested members of a major terrorist cell, I recognized some of the same individuals we had previously detained during disturbances linked to the Abraham Accords," he said. "The progression from ideological activism to involvement in more serious security offenses was striking."

A Delicate Balance

A London-based Gulf journalist familiar with the issue emphasized the need to distinguish between Iranian influence networks and the broader Shiite population.

"The overwhelming majority of Shiite citizens in the Gulf are patriotic and loyal to their countries," he told ME24. "The challenge is not the community itself. The challenge is Iran's attempt to exploit religious ties for political purposes."

He added that a small number of vulnerable individuals can become susceptible to external manipulation when political, ideological, and religious loyalties intersect.

The Bottom Line

For Gulf governments, the challenge extends far beyond individual espionage arrests. Security officials increasingly view the issue as part of a broader contest over influence, identity, and state sovereignty.

Their concern is not that Shiite communities constitute a threat. Rather, it is that Tehran has spent decades building relationships, influence channels, and recruitment pathways that can be activated during periods of regional confrontation.

Intelligence officials argue that modern warfare is no longer fought solely through missiles, drones, and proxy militias. It is also fought through information, influence, and access. The battle now unfolding across the Gulf is therefore not merely about uncovering spies—it is about dismantling the infrastructure that makes espionage possible in the first place.

Moataz AlKhalil is an Egyptian, London-based journalist and media researcher on Middle East affairs. He is a senior contributor to MiddleEast24 and has written for many of the top media platforms across the Middle East.