The Abraham Accords in Wartime: Why Transparency Is Vital to a New Regional Security Framework
By Dr. Najwa AlSaeed
The Abraham Accords were launched in 2020 as a historic diplomatic project built on formal relations, embassies, direct flights, trade, tourism, technology partnerships, and the belief that practical cooperation could reshape the Middle East. Today, they face a far more difficult test. The Gaza war, confrontation involving Iran, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and Saudi targets, missile and drone threats, and risks to energy infrastructure have made collective security an urgent necessity. Yet if the Accords are to develop from a normalization project into a serious regional security framework, their success will depend on more than military capability. It will depend on transparency: clear objectives, publicly understood commitments, accountable institutions, and relationships that do not exist only through secret contacts during crises.
The United Arab Emirates offers the clearest regional example of why transparency matters. The UAE did not treat its relationship with Israel as an undeclared or temporary security channel. It signed a public treaty of peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization in September 2020; the agreement provided for diplomatic relations and resident ambassadors, and it was followed by the opening of embassies in Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Publicly announced agreements then expanded cooperation in trade, investment, aviation, tourism, water, technology, health, innovation, and culture. The UAE–Israel relationship has not been insulated from regional tensions or public criticism, but its formal and visible character has created an institutional basis for dialogue and cooperation that does not depend on rumours, unofficial intermediaries, or crisis-driven contacts.
This example is especially relevant in wartime. A relationship that is public and rules-based can be scrutinized, debated, and adjusted. Governments can explain what they are doing, why it serves national interests, and what limits apply. Parliaments, institutions, businesses, and citizens can assess its economic and security consequences. By contrast, a relationship conducted only through secret intelligence exchanges or discreet military contacts may provide temporary operational benefits, but it is unlikely to create lasting trust or political legitimacy. Security cooperation that cannot be acknowledged openly is vulnerable to public suspicion, misinformation, and sudden reversal.
The Accords have already created important channels for trade, investment, aviation, tourism, technology, and innovation. As a recent Mid.East Journal analysis marking six years of the Abraham Accords noted, these relationships have increasingly developed beyond diplomatic declarations into economic, strategic, and human connections. The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco expanded formal relations with Israel across finance, agriculture, water, cybersecurity, and commercial exchange. Sudan agreed to normalize relations, although its internal instability prevented full implementation. Kazakhstan’s accession in 2025 showed that the framework retained diplomatic relevance beyond the immediate Arab-Israeli arena. But the regional environment has changed. The key question is no longer simply whether normalization can generate prosperity. It is whether states connected to the Accords can develop a transparent and credible framework capable of protecting civilians, critical infrastructure, energy routes, commercial shipping, and national economies during an era of sustained conflict.
Before October 7, 2023, economic interdependence was expected to reduce political distance and gradually strengthen regional stability. Saudi Arabia was widely seen as the pivotal potential addition because a Saudi-Israeli agreement could have transformed the Accords into a broader political, economic, and strategic order. The Gaza war, however, made visible normalization more politically difficult and strengthened demands for a credible political framework before any major new step toward Israel. This makes transparency more, not less, important. A government cannot conduct one policy publicly and another privately without creating a gap between national strategy and public legitimacy. Any state considering formal normalization, limited security coordination, or a military treaty with Israel must explain the purpose, conditions, benefits, and limitations of that relationship to its own public and to the wider region.
At the same time, wartime has demonstrated that threats do not wait for political consensus. A missile launched in one arena can threaten another state’s airspace. A drone attack on energy infrastructure can affect global markets. Disruption in the Red Sea can increase insurance and shipping costs, threaten commercial trade, and undermine national development plans from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. Cyberattacks can target banks, ports, airports, power networks, and digital infrastructure without crossing a physical border. No state, however wealthy or militarily capable, can manage these risks alone. The Abraham Accords should therefore evolve into a practical and defensive security architecture based on shared vulnerabilities: early-warning systems, air and missile defence, intelligence fusion, maritime coordination in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Strait of Hormuz, cybersecurity cooperation, and stronger protection for critical infrastructure.
Security coordination is already emerging, although much of it remains discreet. Recent reporting by Axios on a meeting involving senior military officials from the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt demonstrates growing recognition that shared threats require communication and coordination. However, occasional closed-door meetings are not a substitute for a durable security system. Informal coordination can help manage an immediate emergency, but it does not create mutual obligations, political accountability, or public trust. The task is to build transparent structures that establish clear rules for consultation, intelligence-sharing, crisis response, and the protection of civilian infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia illustrates both the necessity and the difficulty of this transition. Riyadh has maintained that formal normalization with Israel requires a credible political framework and a clear path to Palestinian statehood. This reflects Saudi national interests, regional legitimacy, and the political mood across the Arab and Muslim worlds. At the same time, the latest Houthi escalation has tested the practical value of alternative security partnerships. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan was intended to strengthen collective deterrence without requiring diplomatic recognition of Israel. The agreement did not initially produce an immediate collective military response to Houthi attacks, although the three countries have since moved to activate its mechanisms, and Pakistan has publicly pledged support for Saudi Arabia under the pact. The lesson is not that Saudi Arabia should abandon diversified partnerships, but that a security arrangement must be judged by what it can deliver: integrated intelligence, early warning, credible air and missile defence, command structures, agreed procedures, and a demonstrated willingness to act in a crisis.
Reports of Saudi-Israeli discussions over intelligence-sharing and threat assessment during the Houthi escalation reinforce the same lesson. Regional diplomats told the Jerusalem Post that CENTCOM-mediated talks had taken place regarding possible Israeli intelligence assistance to Saudi Arabia. Such cooperation can be operationally useful, especially in confronting missile, drone, and maritime threats. But it should not remain a concealed, emergency-only relationship. Gulf states considering any relationship with Israel, whether full diplomatic normalization, limited security cooperation, or a formal defence treaty, should learn from the UAE’s experience. They should avoid arrangements that are publicly denied but privately relied upon. Instead, they should establish relationships through clear, public agreements that define their strategic objectives, their defensive scope, the obligations of every side, and the political conditions under which cooperation will continue.
The recent incident involving Flydubai Flight FZ1073 offers a particularly revealing example of both the possibilities and limitations of regional cooperation without formal relations.
After the Dubai-to-Tel Aviv flight was forced to divert to Tabuk, Saudi authorities allowed the aircraft to land safely, assisted the passengers and crew, and provided medical care to injured crew members. The UAE publicly thanked Saudi authorities for their cooperation and handling of the incident. Saudi Arabia’s response was responsible and humanitarian, demonstrating that practical cooperation is possible even in the absence of formal Saudi-Israeli diplomatic relations.
Yet the episode also exposed the continuing political sensitivity surrounding direct engagement with Israel. According to Reuters, Saudi Arabia declined an Israeli request to send military aircraft to retrieve the passengers, who instead remained in Tabuk until another Flydubai aircraft transported them to Israel. The distinction is revealing. Saudi Arabia was willing to receive an Israel-bound civilian aircraft in distress and care for its passengers, but visible, direct cooperation with Israeli aircraft remained a more politically sensitive step.
That tension goes directly to the question of transparency. Arab states have every right to disagree with Israeli policies and to set their own diplomatic conditions, but a widening gap between private cooperation and public rhetoric carries risks of its own. When governments privately seek intelligence, technological, or security assistance from Israel while allowing engagement with Israel itself to be treated publicly as taboo or inherently illegitimate, they can create an environment in which hostility and misinformation are allowed to flourish. Governments cannot expect societies to understand the strategic rationale for cooperation that they themselves are unwilling to acknowledge.
The alleged actions of the Omani co-pilot aboard FZ1073 should not be presented as a proven consequence of this contradiction. The official investigation is continuing, and the UAE has specifically said that investigators are still examining the circumstances and motives, including whether terrorism or prior planning was involved. But the incident raises a broader and legitimate question about the environment in which regional engagement with Israel is simultaneously practiced in private and treated as unacceptable in public. If Arab governments conclude that cooperation with Israel serves their national interests, they should be willing to explain why. Transparency does not require agreement with every Israeli policy. It requires acknowledging that cooperation itself can be legitimate.
This does not require every Gulf state to follow the UAE’s exact diplomatic model or move at the same pace. Each state has distinct national interests, domestic considerations, and regional responsibilities. But the principle should be the same: no durable relationship with Israel can be built on ambiguity, secrecy, or discreet crisis-driven contacts. If a state decides that cooperation serves its security, economic, or diplomatic interests, it should state that decision openly and explain its rationale. If it seeks a military or security treaty, the treaty should be public, limited to clearly defined defensive objectives, and subject to recognized legal and political procedures. If it chooses not to normalize diplomatically, it should still ensure that any limited security coordination is governed by clear safeguards and is not allowed to become an unaccountable parallel foreign policy.
A credible regional security framework must therefore be transparent, defensive, and governed by clear political conditions. Governments should explain what threats are being addressed, what each participant is expected to contribute, which commitments are binding, who makes decisions in a crisis, and what limits apply to military involvement. Clear rules for intelligence exchange, crisis consultation, command coordination, legal oversight, and periodic review are essential. Without these safeguards, cooperation may remain tactically useful but politically fragile. With them, it can acquire the legitimacy needed to survive beyond the immediate emergency that created it.
The Abraham Accords should not be discarded because wartime has made normalization more difficult. Rather, the conflict has revealed why their underlying logic remains important. The region needs institutions capable of managing common dangers before they become wars, protecting trade routes and civilian infrastructure, reducing miscalculation, and creating incentives for restraint. Not every country must establish full diplomatic relations with Israel immediately. States may participate at different levels according to their national interests and political circumstances. Some may focus first on maritime security, early warning, cyber defence, or protecting energy and transport infrastructure. Others may advance economic partnerships, political dialogue, and eventually formal diplomatic relations. But participation at every level should be open, rules-based, and anchored in clearly stated national and regional objectives.
This is the meaning of a security-plus-normalization model. The Abraham Accords should not be judged solely by the number of embassies opened or countries added to a diplomatic declaration. Their value should also be measured by whether they prevent attacks, protect civilians, secure shipping routes, strengthen resilience against cyber and missile threats, and preserve space for political dialogue. U.S. policymakers are moving in this direction through the proposed Abraham Accords Defense Cooperation Act of 2026, which would encourage deeper defence planning, counter-drone capabilities, air-defence cooperation, special-operations development, and joint air and naval exercises among countries connected to the Accords. The legislation remains pending, but its premise is important: normalization and security can no longer be treated as separate agendas.
The Abraham Accords cannot resolve the region’s political conflicts by themselves, nor can they replace diplomacy, justice, or a credible political settlement. But they can provide a framework through which regional states address a central strategic reality: no country can sustain its security while the wider region remains permanently unstable. The choice is between a narrow normalization project, vulnerable to every new crisis, and a transparent, defensive, and accountable security framework that links peace, prosperity, deterrence, and political responsibility. The UAE has shown that public agreements and institutionalized ties can provide a foundation for such a relationship. Other Gulf states may choose different forms and timelines of engagement, but they should not choose secrecy as a substitute for strategy. In wartime, transparency is not an optional addition to regional security; it is the condition that makes cooperation legitimate, credible, and lasting.
Dr. Najwa AlSaeed is a Professor at City University Ajman and contributes as a writer and researcher to several prominent publications. She can be contacted at: a.najwa@cu.ac.ae