A U.S.–Israel–Iran War Halftime Scorecard: Who’s Winning? What Are the Right Questions to Ask?
- Dan Feferman
- 3 days ago
- 9 min read
By most measures, the current U.S.–Israel war with Iran is not over—but it may be at halftime, or perhaps entering the fourth quarter. After five weeks of intense fighting, both sides have paused—and for now, the pause appears likely to hold.
Like any contest at halftime, the question is not who has won, but how to read the score—and what it suggests about the second half.
The war that began on February 28 with surprise U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran included a sustained bombing campaign—over 18,000 Israeli munitions dropped and more than 10,000 precision strikes conducted inside Iran, alongside thousands of additional U.S. strikes¹. This was met by persistent Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel, Gulf states, and U.S. positions across the region.
In recent days, however, the battlefield has begun to give way—at least partially—to diplomacy. U.S. officials are cautiously signaling progress in talks with Iran, particularly regarding constraints on its nuclear program and the future of its enriched uranium stockpile, with indications that Tehran may be showing increased flexibility under pressure.
At the same time, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon has taken hold—at least temporarily—marking a potential de-escalation on one of the war’s most volatile fronts, even as underlying tensions remain unresolved. (This was apparently an Iranian demand and US concession.)
These developments do not signal the end of the conflict however. Rather, they suggest a transition into a different phase—one in which military gains, diplomatic maneuvering, and political and economic pressures are increasingly intertwined.
In that sense, this is less a single war than an ongoing series—one in which each side is playing by different rules. The most useful way to understand the current moment, then, is not as a verdict, but as a halftime scorecard.
How to Measure the First Half
A common analytical mistake is to treat this as a singular conflict that began on February 28, and whose outcome can already be determined. In reality, this war is one phase within a broader, long-running confrontation that began in 1979 and will likely be decided over a much longer horizon when the Islamic regime collapses.
It also reflects a clash between two competing strategic approaches. The United States and Israel are pursuing a campaign centered on degrading capabilities, disrupting infrastructure, and shaping conditions for long-term change. Deterrence is no longer an option as Iran is not easily deterred. Iran, by contrast, appears to be pursuing a strategy rooted in endurance. For regimes such as Iran’s, survival is not merely a fallback—it is central to their theory of victory.
By most conventional military measures, the United States and Israel appear to hold a clear advantage. Iran’s senior leadership has been significantly degraded. Its military infrastructure and defense industries have sustained substantial damage. Its network of regional proxies has been further weakened.
At the same time, Iran remains in the game. It retains the capacity to continue limited attacks and to absorb ongoing pressure. Most importantly, it showed that it can threaten and impact global energy prices while manipulating western public opinion. As a result, battlefield outcomes alone are unlikely to determine the final result—particularly given the asymmetric nature of each side’s objectives.
War Aims and Strategic Scope
At a strategic level, the long-term objective—shared, at least implicitly, by the United States, Israel, and several regional actors—would be a fundamental transformation of the Iranian regime, as behavioral change is a non-starter. However, it is unclear that such an outcome was the immediate objective of this campaign, despite some rhetoric to the contrary.
The opening decapitation strikes—which eliminated Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a significant portion of the regime’s senior leadership—may have been intended to disrupt decision-making and potentially create conditions for internal instability. They also came on the heel of the most serious uprisings in Iran to date. Nonetheless, regime change through external military pressure alone is near impossible to achieve.
More immediate objectives likely included: pushing Iran further from nuclear breakout capability; degrading its missile arsenal and defense industrial base; neutralizing key elements of its air defenses; limiting its ability to threaten maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz; and continuing the longer-term effort to weaken its proxy network.
In scoreboard terms, these represent measurable but partial gains—important, but not yet a knockout punch.
Regime Change: A Long Shot, Still in Play
Regime change remains the ultimate objective—but one that was never likely to be achieved quickly. Much like the fall of the Soviet Union - regime changes often happen slowly, unpredictably, then quickly and chaotically. They are no neat affair.
The opening strikes eliminated a significant portion of Iran’s leadership, including senior IRGC and intelligence figures. Estimates suggest that approximately 1,500 regime and IRGC personnel were killed, including dozens of high-level commanders.
While this creates disruption and internal instability, the Iranian regime is structured to absorb such shocks. Power is diffuse, redundant, and designed for survival. Some analysts are claiming that the new guard, the powers behind Mojataba, might even be more radical than the previous, somehow.
Still, the long-term effects may prove more consequential. The regime now faces economic collapse, internal disarray, and a population already primed for unrest. If it struggled to contain previous protests, it may face greater challenges once the immediate wartime environment subsides.
For now, this front remains unresolved.
Scoreboard: Inconclusive, disadvantage to the Islamic regime
Nuclear Program: Strategic Uncertainty
Iran’s nuclear program appears to have been set back—likely by several years, with estimates ranging from two to eight in the June 2025 campaign.
However, the central issue remains unresolved.
Iran is believed to retain approximately 450 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium—material that, if further enriched, could be sufficient for multiple nuclear devices. The status and future disposition of this stockpile remain unclear.
Recent diplomatic signals suggest that the current phase of the conflict may be pushing Iran toward a negotiated outcome, with U.S. demands focused on limiting enrichment to civilian levels and removing enriched material from Iranian territory.
Whether that outcome materializes will be decisive. Perhaps the most decisive aspect.
In scoreboard terms, the program has been pushed back—but not removed from play.
The diplomatic talks in the coming weeks and their implementation will tell us everything.
Scoreboard: Inconclusive, leaning toward the US/Israeli side.
Missile Program and Defense Industry: A Decisive Lead
Prior to the war, Iran possessed one of the largest missile arsenals in the world—estimated at approximately 2,500–3,000 ballistic missiles, alongside thousands of drones and cruise missiles, and a production capacity of roughly 100 missiles per month².
During the conflict, Iran launched over 600 ballistic missiles and 200 drones at Israel, while firing more than 4,000 projectiles at Gulf states³.
Coalition operations appear to have significantly disrupted this capability. Estimates suggest that 60–80% of Iran’s missile arsenal and much of its launch infrastructure have been destroyed or rendered inoperable, alongside severe damage to its production capacity³.
Iran retains the ability to continue launching missiles—albeit at reduced rates—but its ability to regenerate this capability is now significantly constrained.
This represents one of the clearest wins for the US/Israeli side, even if Iran continued firing to the end.
At the same time, the conflict underscores a core feature of Iran’s strategy: even under sustained pressure, it can continue generating attacks at scale using relatively low-cost, resilient systems.
Scoreboard: Major lead for the US and Israel; major setback for Iran
Proxy Network: Continued Erosion
Iran’s proxy network has been further weakened.
Hamas has sustained major losses. Hezbollah, while still operational, has been degraded and is now constrained by a newly reached ceasefire. Iran’s broader regional position has been weakened by pressure on multiple fronts.
Iran is now operating with a significantly reduced bench.
If measured on this front alone, the advantage clearly favors the United States and its partners.
Scoreboard: major win for the US and especially Israel.
Regional Escalation: A Contested Field
Iran attempted to expand the conflict by targeting Gulf states and regional infrastructure in an effort to generate broader political pressure.
The scale was significant, but the strategy appears to have fallen short. Rather than fracture the coalition, regional alignment with the United States and Israel has largely held and perhaps might even highlight the importance and urgency of expanding the Abraham Accords.
The US would be wise to push for an expanded strategic defense umbrella, tying membership to improved ties with Israel.
In scoreboard terms, this remains a contested field—but one where Iran has not achieved its intended outcome.
Scoreboard: inconclusive, leaning against Iran.
Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s biggest strategic card in play
Iran has partially employed one of its most powerful strategic tools: its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
Rather than fully closing the strait, Iran has used calibrated disruption—restricting access selectively while allowing certain traffic to pass—driving price volatility while avoiding full escalation.
The United States response (instituting its own blockade) has turned this into a test of resolve rather than a decisive confrontation. Who will blink first?
The key question remains: whether this capability can be neutralized in a sustained way. It may just be it was Iran’s only real avenue to pressure the US, albeit indirectly.
For now, this remains one of Iran’s strongest cards; around which the threat of an escalation was enough to bring about the current talks.
Scoreboard: tie
The Informational and Political Arena
Iran’s strategy extends beyond the battlefield. It has pursued a sustained informational campaign aimed at shaping perceptions—particularly in Western societies—where skepticism about the war’s purpose and effectiveness is growing.
This is not incidental. It is part of Iran’s broader strategy: to combine endurance with political pressure. Iran and its allies realized that sewing division and attacking western resolve can be as effective as anything kinetic on the battlefield.
At the same time, the United States has yet to fully articulate the war’s objectives to domestic and international audiences. This has complicated efforts to sustain long-term support, while Israel’s strategic communications, while coherent on Iran, do not generally hold sway with global audiences.
Scoreboard: Iran’s clearest points scored.
Halftime Score: A Conditional Advantage
Too often, Western audiences approach wars with a degree of misunderstanding—about how they start, unfold, end, and what military force and diplomacy can realistically achieve and when they are employed. There is a tendency to look for decisive moments, for clear victories, for knockout blows. This conflict is unlikely to produce one in the near term.
At this stage, the United States and Israel appear to hold a meaningful advantage on most elements. Iran has suffered a series of serious strategic setbacks—not necessarily to the survival of the regime itself, but to its ability to project power and offer it a strategic umbrella - what might be described as its strategic trifecta: its nuclear program, its missile arsenal, and its network of regional proxies which both allow power projection and deniability.
At the same time, these gains remain incomplete. Iran retains the capacity to absorb pressure, to continue limited but persistent attacks, and to maneuver politically and diplomatically. This is not incidental—it is central to how the regime fights and survives.
Perhaps most importantly, Iran’s strongest card has never been purely military. It lies in its ability to disrupt the global economic system—most notably through its position astride key maritime chokepoints. The Strait of Hormuz alone carries roughly 20–25% of global seaborne oil trade, making even partial disruption enough to drive price shocks and global economic instability. Iran has already demonstrated a willingness to play this card in calibrated ways—raising costs without triggering full-scale escalation.
Beyond Hormuz, the potential expansion of pressure toward the Bab el-Mandeb—through Iran’s Houthi allies—raises the possibility of compounding disruptions across another critical artery linking the Red Sea to global shipping routes. Even limited instability in these corridors has already demonstrated outsized effects on energy markets and global supply chains, underscoring how relatively low-cost actions can generate disproportionate strategic impact.
In this sense, Iran’s strategy combines endurance on the battlefield with leverage over the global economy and a sustained informational campaign that has, over time, shaped perceptions in parts of the West. This includes growing skepticism about the war’s justification, its effectiveness, and even its origins—doubts that are not accidental, but cultivated. In many parts of the west, Iran is seen as the victim while Israel and the west the unbridled aggressors.
In this context, diplomacy is unlikely to succeed in isolation. Any emerging agreement—particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear program—will depend not only on the terms reached, but on sustained pressure, credible enforcement, and continued efforts to deny Iran the ability to rebuild its capabilities over time. The regime has historically used negotiations not as a pathway to agreement, but as a means of buying time and preserving optionality.
The broader strategic question remains unresolved. Iran now faces a growing tension between short-term regime preservation and its long-standing commitment to exporting its revolutionary model—particularly in the wake of domestic unrest and the significant damage inflicted on its economic and national infrastructure. Whether that tension leads to recalibration or retrenchment remains to be seen.
Whether viewed as halftime in a single conflict or one phase in a longer series, the current moment reflects a familiar pattern. The United States and Israel have delivered significant blows—but not a decisive one.
They go into the half with a clear lead—but without a knockout.
Western publics would be wise to understand this broader dynamic and have strategic patience along with a clear understanding of Iran and its true goals, and when diplomacy must be ditched for forceful means.
Dan Feferman is the co-editor-in-chief of MiddleEast24. Previously, he served as a policy and intelligence analyst in the Israeli military and as a fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute.